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RECENT CASES
Antitrust-Burden of Proof-"Clear Proof" Standard Applied to
Union Liability Under Sherman Act
Plaintiffs, alleging that the United Mine Workers of America
(UMW) entered into a conspiracy with large coal producers to create
a monopoly, to suppress competition, and to drive the plaintiffs out of
business,' brought a joint action2 against the UMW for violations of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.3 Defendant contended their
1. In the late 1940's the UMW faced a Taft-Hartley injunction, contempt, and unfair labor
practice charges by the federal government and coal operators. In this context the Bituminous
Coal Operators Association (BCOA), an organization of large coal operators, entered into
negotiations with the UMW and in 1950 signed the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement.
For background information and the changes after the 1950 Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement,
see Adam, Technology and Productivity in Bituminous Coal, 1949-59, 84 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
1081 (1961). In 1958 BCOA and UMW agreed upon a supplemental Protective Wage Clause
which the plaintiffs contended included an agreement by the UMW to impose the wage scale on
all bargaining units in the mining industry. The Protective Wage Clause provides: "During the
period of this Contract, the United Mine Workers of America will not enter into, be a party to,
nor will it permit any agreement or understanding covering any wages, hours or other conditions
of work applicable to employees covered by this Contract on any basis other than those specified
in this Contract or any applicable District Contract." Ramsey v. UMW, 265 F. Supp. 388, 411
(E.D. Tenn. 1967).
Subsequent to this agreement UMW loaned Cyrus Eaton $25 million to buy controlling
stock in the Western Kentucky Coal Company. Western Kentucky immediately signed the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement which was the first time they -had ever signed a
contract with the UMW. Plaintiffs contended that -Western Kentucky engaged in price butting
which drove their coal out of the TVA market.
After 1958 southeastern Tennessee was subjected to picketing and violence which plaintiffs
allege was instigated by the UMW. Plaintiffs' theory was that the UMW drove prices down with
predatory pricing, while forcing labor costs up by causing general violence and intimidation. The
net result was to harass the plaintiffs from both directions until they were forced to leave the
market.
2. Tennessee Products and Chemical Corporation and Tennessee Consolidated Coal
Company control the major portion of coal mining in southeastern Tennessee. Lessees from these
companies operate small trunk mines and constitute the majority of plaintiffs. Plaintiff Ramsey,
however, owns his own land and operates as Ramsey Coal Company. The original action was
brought by 26 parties against numerous defendants. At the trial 16 parties remained as plaintiffs,
while the UMW was the only defendant.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964): "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal ....
"
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964): "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court."
For an analysis of whether labor unions should be subject to the Sherman Act, see C.
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actions furthered the long-established policy of seeking national
uniformity of wages and were exempt from antitrust prosecution under

the Clayton Act.' The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee denied relieP and held that even though plaintiffs

had established the UMW's antitrust violation by a preponderance of
evidence, a labor union cannot be convicted except by the "clear
proof" required in section 6 of the Norris-La Guardia Act.' A three
judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed 7 and
ruled that the preponderance of evidence test governed. The Sixth

Circuit granted defendant's petition to rehear en banc, 8 and in a fourfour decision which reinstated the district court's opinion,' held, the
GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 200-22 (2d rev. ed. 1961); Daykin, The Status Of Unions Under
Our Antitrust Laws, II LAB. L.J. 216 (1960); Note, Union-EnIployer Agreements And The

Antitrust Laws: The Pennington And Jewel Tea Cases, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 901 (1966).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964). Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides: "The labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws
shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or
conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under
the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964). It has been suggested that the commands of the
Clayton Act have been diluted. E.g., Cox, Labor And The Antitrust Laws-A Prelhinharyv
Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 252 (1955); Note, Collective Bargaining Under the Antitrust Laws,
61 Nw. U.L. REV. 156 (1966).
5. Ramsey v. UMW, 265 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15. Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides: "No officer or
member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or
interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United States
for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual
participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual
knowledge thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1964). The necessity for enacting the Norris-LaGuardia
Act is analyzed in Note, Labor Injunctions And Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contetnporary'
Role of Norris-LaGuardia,70 YALE L.J. 70,73-74 (1961).
7. Ramsey v. UMW, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., No. 405, April 15, 1969, at X-2
(6th Cir. April 8, 1969).
8. Plaintiffs alleged that they should have been allowed to file a reply to the defendant's
petition to rehear despite Rule 40(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure which provides:
"No answer to a petition for rehearing will be received unless requested by the Court but a
petition for rehearing will ordinarily not be granted in the absence of such a request." In the
absence of the plaintiffs' reply brief, the five judges who had not heard oral argument on the
"clear proof" rule were forced to render a decision solely on the basis of the defendant's petition
to rehear. Plaintiffs contended such practice is inequitable because Rule 40(a) was intended to
apply only when the same judges who heard the original case render a decision on the petition to
rehear. Plaintiffs' Petition to Rehear at 2,3.
9. Plaintiffs contended that the four-four split leaves the three judge panel's reversal of the
district court standing, rather than reinstating the district court's opinion, and cite as authority
Carmichael v. Eberle, 177 U.S. 63 (1900); Pitton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 144 Fla. 462, 198
So. 503 (1940). Plaintiffs' Petition to Rehear at 2,3.
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"clear proof" requirement of section 6 of the Norris-La Guardia Act

controls the standard of proof on all issues in an antitrust action
against a labor union. Ramsey v. UMW, 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969).
Although union exemption from antitrust suits has been a fully
litigated issue both before and after passage of the Norris-La Guardia
Act in 1932,10 none of the litigation provided significant discussion of

the "clear proof" doctrine in section 6 until United Brotherhood of
Carpenters v. United States." After determining that section 6

prescribes limitations which courts must apply in all matters arising
out of labor disputes covered by the Norris-LaGuardia Act,12 that
Court held that the purpose of the "clear proof" test was to relieve

unions of liability for the lawless acts committed by union officers or
members in labor disputes in the absence of "clear proof" that the

union participated in, authorized, or ratified such acts. 13 This holding
limits section 6 to a determination of a union's liability for the illegal

acts of its agent. The only other non-antitrust case to discuss "clear
proof" was UMW v. Gibbs" which involved recovery under section

303 of the Labor Management Relations Act 5 for violence committed
by union members. The majority defined "clear proof" as "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing proof"18 and suggested that "clear proof"

dictates a standard of proof greater than preponderance of the
evidence, but less than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt required

in criminal cases.17 Other than this proposed definition of "clear
proof," the Court confined its examination of "clear proof" to a

determination of whether the union ratified the violence 8 and offered
10. The cases which have addressed themselves to the question of the scope of the union's
antitrust exemption include: Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) (union
activity with a combination of businessmen to prevent all other competition not exempt); United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (strike and economic boycott expressly exempt from
Sherman Act); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (Sherman Act only covers
activities having substantial effect on commercial competition); Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (secondary boycott held a violation of antitrust laws). For a
suggestion as to what the extent of a union's exemption should be, see Note, Labor-Antitrust:
Collective Bargainingand the Competitive Economy, 20 STAN. L. REV.684, 698-99 (1967).
I1. 330 U.S. 395 (1947). This was a criminal case in which manufacturers and dealers in
millwork and lumber allegedly conspired with an unincorporated union.
12. Id. at 401. The two elements of this idea which must be present are: first, the presence
of a labor dispute; and secondly, this dispute must be covered by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. If
either of these elements is absent, the Court's suggestion that § 6 applies to all matters arising
out of labor disputes is inapplicable.
13. Id. at403.
14. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68, 171-87 (1964).
16. 383 U.S. at 737.
17. Id.
18. Id. at735-42.
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no comment on how far the scope of section 6 could be extended. Issues
similar to those in Ramsey were first litigated by the Sixth Circuit in
Pennington v. UMW (Pennington 1).19 The Sixth Circuit approved the

district court's jury charge, which was couched in terms of
preponderance of evidence, and affirmed its finding of an antitrust

violation; however, it failed to analyze the "clear proof" rule in
depth. 20 On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed on other
grounds in Pennington v. UMW (Pennington II),21 but affirmed the
holding that the union's exemption from the antitrust laws did not
apply.2 2 The majority opinion used the phrase "clearly shown" when
defining the scope of a union's antitrust exemption,2 3 but this was done
without specific reference to section 6.24 On retrial of the case in Lewis
v. Pennington (Pennington III),21 the district court ruled in favor of the
UMW because the plaintiffs failed to meet either the preponderance of

evidence or "clear proof" test. Relying solely upon Gibbs, the court
in Pennington III provided the first implication that a union's antitrust
violation must be demonstrated by "clear proof. '26 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action
against the UMW in Lewis v." Pennington (Pennington IVfl and

interpreted Pennington II to hold that "such an anti-competitive
conspiracy must be established by 'clear proof.'

"28

Before the Sixth

Circuit rendered judgment in Pennington IV, the district court in the
19. 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963). In Pennington I the UMW sued a coal producer for
welfare fund payments. Pennington counterclaimed on the theory that the union had eonspired
with large coal producers to drive him out of business.
20. Although the UMW asserted that § 6 should have been applied, the court found
that § 6 was not the controlling standard. Ramsey v. UMW, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.,
No. 405, April 15, 1969, at X-4 (6th Cir. April 8, 1969) (Sixth Circuit's interpretation of its
decision in Pennington I).
21. 381 U.S. 657, 670-72 (1965). Many comments have been written on Pennington I. E.g.,
51 CORNELL L.Q. 576 (1966); 44 N.C.L. REv. 474 (1966); 43 TEXAS L. REv. 1122 (1965).
22. 381 U.S. at 661.
23. "But we think a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when it is clearly
shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other
bargaining units." Id. at 665.
24. It has been suggested that after Pennington HI the scope of labor's antitrust exemption
was defined by the Labor Management Relations Act rather than the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 254, 260 (1967).
25. 257 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
26. The court suggests that "[i]n the ordinary case, proof would be simply by a
preponderance of the evidence and in the criminal case guilt would have to be established beyond
a reasonable doubt. Under Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in the Gibbs case, a middle ground is reached with respect to the quantum of proof
necessary for civil liability." Id. at 829.
27. 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968).
28. Id. at 814.
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Ramsey chain of cases dismissed the plaintiffs' case in Ramsey v.
U V1W (Ramsey I).9 This court admitted that if the preponderance of
evidence rule were applied, the UMW would be guilty. On the basis of
Gibbs and United Brotherhood of Carpenters, however, the court ruled
that the "clear proof" test under section 6 must be applied and that
the plaintiffs had not clearly proved a Sherman Act violation. 0 In the

same district court at almost the same time, facts identical to those in
Ramsey I were presented to a jury under both "clear proof" and

preponderance of the evidence instructions in Tennessee Consolidated
Coal Co. v. UMW. 3 1 The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the

plaintiffs' contention that the UMW had violated the Sherman Act.
Before Tennessee Consolidated could be decided on appeal, a three
judge panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed Ramsey I's decision and held
in Ramsey v. UMW (Ramsey IIP2 that the "clear proof" standard
was inapplicable to proving a union's antitrust conspiracy and that

such a conspiracy need be proved only by a preponderance of the
evidence.3 3 One week before the Sixth Circuit sat en banc to rehear the
appeal from Ramsey I, it affirmed the district court's conspiracy
finding in Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co. v. UMW. The court
introduced a new interpretation of section 6 and asserted that section
29. 265 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
30. Judge Wilson's opinion analyzed collective bargaining before and after the 1950
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, the Wage Protection Clause itself, the alleged
predatory pricing of coal, and other factors such as geological conditions which contributed to
the plaintiffs' inability to operate competitively. Judge Wilson concluded that the inferences of
the existence or non-existence of a conspiracy were equal on both sides, so that the plaintiffs failed
to meet the "clear proof" test.
31. The only significant difference between this case and Ramsey I is that Judge Wilson
presided over a jury trial. His charge stated: "Thus, labor unions may not be held liable for the
acts of officers or members or agents or third parties, without clear proof that the labor union
actually participated, gave prior authorization or ratified such act after full knowledge of their
commission. . . . Now, upon each and every other issue in the case, the plaintiffs are merely
required to establish their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, and needs [sic] not carry
the burden of proof upon such issues by clear proof as I have defined those terms." Tennessee
Consol. Coal Co. v. UMW, 416 F.2d 1192, 1201-02 (6th Cir. 1969), citing Trial Record at 1703a1705a.
32. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., No. 405, April 15, 1969, at X-2 (6th Cir. April 8,

1969).
33. The three judge panel argued that because Mr. Justice White's use of the words "clearly
shown" in Pennington II was dictum, the "clear proof' rule which the district court relied upon
lacked sufficient precedent. The majority opinion also pointed out that in Pennington I the same
Sixth Circuit had already rejected UM w's contention that § 6 should have been applied. See
note 20 supra.
34. 416 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3335, 3342 (U.S. Mar. 3,
1970). This judgment was for $1,432,500 and $67,500, which is possibly the largest ever affirmed
against a labor union at the appellate level. Defendant's Petition to Rehear En Banc at 2-3.
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6 must be applied only to proving the union's authorization,
participation, or ratification by "clear proof" because section 6 was
35
not intended to test the unlawfulness of an act.
In the instant case, the court faced the same issues presented in
Tennessee Consolidated and determined that in the absence of a per se
antitrust violation 6 it was still possible for the Wage Protection Clause
of 1958 to give evidence of an illegal conspiracy by the BCOA and
UMW to impose a wage scale on the mining industry. The court first
recognized that a union is exempt from antitrust prosecution so long
as it "acts in its own self-interest and does not combine with non-labor
groups." 37 In order to determine whether the UMW conspired with a
non-labor group, it is essential to apply a specific standard of proof,
either the "clear proof" test in section 6 or the preponderance of
evidence standard. The majority 38 attempted to choose between these
standards and examined the question whether all elements of an
antitrust suit have to be established by "clear proof." In the instant
case, the court began its development of the "clear proof" test by
referring to portions of the district court opinions in Pennington III
and Ramsey I in which both judges concluded that it was necessary for
the plaintiffs to present "clear proof" of the conspiracy. 3 Quoting with
approval Mr. Justice White's reasoning in Pennington 114 and the
Sixth Circuit's language in Pennington IV, which asserted that
Pennington II meant "such anti-competitive conspiracy must be
established by 'clear proof,' "41 the majority then turned to the history
of section 6 and interpreted it to have been passed by Congress to apply
to situations identical to the instant case in which a conspiracy is
involved. The court further argued that the Supreme Court in United
Brotherhoodof Carpentershad examined section 6 and determined that
it governed all matters arising in labor disputes,4 2 and concluded that
35. "Section 6 does provide that participation, authorization or ratification must be shown
by clear proof. Section 6 does not state that the unlawful acts must be shown by clear proof."
416 F.2d at 1201.
36. The 4 judges for affirmance dismissed one issue when they found that the Protective
Wage Clause of 1958 between the BCOA and UMW was expressly limited to the signatories and
did not constitute a per se violation of the antitrust laws.
37. 416 F.2d at 659, citing United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
38. Because the Sixth Circuit reached a split decision, there was no true majority or
dissenting opinion. Instead, there were 4 judges for affirmance and 4 for reversal. The opinion
for affirmance will be referred to as the majority, while the opinion for reversal will be tcrmed
the dissent.
39. 416 F.2d at 659-60. Text accompanying notes 26 & 30 supra.
40. See note 23 supra.
41. 416 F.2d at 661, citing Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 814 (6th Cir. 1968).
42. Text accompanying note 12 supra.
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395

the line of authority developed through United Brotherhood of
Carpenters, Gibbs, Pennington II, Pennington IV, and Ramsey I
required that the "clear proof" standard in section 6 be applied to all
43
issues in a union antitrust suit.
The dissent's44 thesis was that the "clear proof" standard is
limited to proof of an alleged agent's authority and that the
development of the "clear proof" test through Ramsey I lacked a
sufficient basis because the cases that the majority relied upon could
either be distinguished or had erroneously interpreted Pennington II.
First, the dissent noted that the majority misinterpreted Pennington II,
which did not argue that the "clear proof" standard controls all issues
in a uniion antitrust suit because none of the three justices who filed
opinions mentioned section 6. Secondly, Pennington III failed to cite
Pennington II as authority, but relied upon Gibbs to hold that the
"clear proof" test controlled. Consequently, the dissent asserted that
Pennington II cannot be the genesis of the "clear proof" test. Instead,
it was not until Pennington IV and Ramsey I that a court suggested
the holding in Pennington II included a requirement for proving a
union's conspiracy by "clear proof." The Sixth Circuit in Pennington
IV, however, gave no explanation for its interpretation of Pennington
II,15 but merely cited the one instance when Justice White used the
phrase "clearly shown" in reference to the union's antitrust
exemption." In Ramsey I, the dissent argued that the district court's
43. In an attempt to supplement its conclusion, the court weighed policy considerations and
claimed that in order to reconcile the national labor policy of collective bargaining with antitrust
statutes, the "clear proof" test must be applied. Implicitly the majority concluded that if the
preponderance test were utilized, it would be easier for plaintiffs to prove a union conspiracy
which in turn would tip the balance in favor of antitrust prosecution and against collective
bargaining. For a general analysis of labor unions, collective bargaining, and the Sherman Act,
see E. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT (1930); M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR
LAw (2d ed. 1965); R. POUND, LEGAL IMMUNITIES OF LABOR UNIONS (1957). There are opposing
views in regard to whether antitrust policy conflicts with collective bargaining. Compare Winter,
Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application Of Antitrust Standards To Union
Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963), with Frank, The Myth Of The Conflict Between Antitrust
Law And Labor Law In the Application Of Antitrust Law To Union Activity, 69 DICK. L. REv.
1 (1964). A few authors advocate elimination of the union exemption from antitrust prosecution.
E.g., Lewis, The Labor Monopoly Problem: A Positive Program, 59 J. POL. EcON. 277, 278
(1951); Miller, Unions and the Antitrust Laws, 7 LAB. L.J. 186 (1956). This difference of opinion
over unions and antitrust policy has also been expressed by the Supreme Court. Compare Mr.
Justice Douglas' dissent in UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 673 (1965), with Mr. Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinion in Meat Cutters Union v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 698
(1965).
44. 416 F.2d at 667.
45. 400 F.2d 806, 814 (6th Cir. 1968).
46. See note 23 supra.
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reliance on Gibbs and United Brotherhood of Carpenters was
unfounded. Although United Brotherhood of Carpenters stated that
section 6 applied to "all matters growing out of labor disputes,"' 7 the
dissent suggested that the district court failed to note that further in
the opinion the Court specifically stated its holding in terms of limiting
a union's liability for illegal acts committed by individual members of
the union. 48 Gibbs,49 the dissent continued, questioned the union's
liability for violence committed by its members and limited its holding
to an application of the "clear proof" standard to cases involving a
union's participation in, approval, or ratification of violence."0 Because
the majority's reasoning was based on an erroneous interpretation of
the cases that discuss "clear proof," the dissent concluded that section
6 must be limited to an examination of an officer or union member's
authority to act for a union, and the preponderance of evidence test
governs the question of an alleged conspiracy between BCOA and the
UMW. 51
It is suggested that the instant court's holding in favor of applying

the "clear proof" standard to all issues in a union antitrust suit is the
culmination of a misinterpretation of section 6 and the consecutive
application of that error. There is an inherent fallacy in the court's
reasoning because this section does not intimate that the "clear proof"
test be applied to determine the illegality of an act. Instead, the section
is phrased in terms of applying the "clear proof" test to specific acts
that are already deemed to be unlawful under a different standard of
prooL 52 Clearly, the assumption that illegal acts exist indicates that
47. 330 U.S. at 401; Text accompanying note 12 supra.
48. Text accompanying note 13 supra. The dissent suggests that this statement does not
mean the "clear proof" standard has replaced the preponderance of evidence rule in union
antitrust suits.
49. Text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
50. "What is required is proof, either that the union approved the violence which occurred,
or that it participated actively or by knowing tolerance in further acts which were in themselves
actionableunder state law or intentionally drew upon the previous violence for their force." 383
U.S. at 739 (emphasis added).
51. The dissent concluded with a policy argument and suggested that the courts must not
read anything new into § 6 that would increase the labor union's insulation from antitrust
prosecution beyond the confines of the Clayton Act. Such insulation would result if the more
stringent "clear proof" test were applied to union antitrust prosecutions. From an equitable
standpoint, the union's conduct in the instant case does not merit the protection offered by § 6.
52. "To hold that officers or members of a labor organization, or the organization itself,
should be liable for damages for unlawful acts committed while a strike is on, without clear,
actual proof of authorization, participation in, or ratification of such unlawful acts, would go
far toward the destruction of organized labor." S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1932).
"This section speaks for itself and is desirable because both individuals and associations have been
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Congress intended section 6 to be applied to cases that attempt to
attribute the illegal acts of alleged agents to the union. Section 6,
however, was not meant to supplant the pre-existing rules'of agency,
but only to be utilized as a rule of evidence for determining the union's
liability for the acts of others. 53 Not only did the Sixth Circuit fail to

consider this congressional intent, but they overlooked an excellent
5 in which
analysis of such intent in United Brotherhoodof Carpenters,

the Supreme Court assumed that before the "clear proof" rule could
be utilized, unlawful acts had to be committed in labor disputes. 5' The
instant court also neglected to analyze language in Gibbs that assumed

the presence of acts otherwise actionable" and suggested that "the
driving force behind § 6 . . . was the fear that unions might be

destroyed if they could be held liable for damage done by acts beyond
their practical control. '

57

If the Sixth Circuit had more thoroughly

considered either of these cases, they would not have rendered a
decision in derogation of Congress's clear assumptions and intent.

Another possible weakness in the majority opinion is that section
6 may not have been intended by Congress to be applied to the act of
conspiracy. Instead, Congress referred to unlawful acts such as

instances of property damage or personal injury.58 United Brotherhood
of Carpenters perceived this distinction by discussing the purpose of

section 6 in terms of "lawless acts done in labor disputes"59 which
assumes there is a labor dispute and intimates that a tortious act or
property damage has resulted. Gibbs also suggested that the "clear

proof" rule applies to acts other than conspiracies by arguing that
held liable for unlawful acts of overzealous members which acts . . . were entirely without the
scope of any authority committed by the officer or association of the offending member." H.R.
REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1932).
53. "[Tlhis section is concerned especially with establishing a rule of evidence." S. REP.
No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1932). "This provision does not affect the general law of
agency, and it is necessary, under the circumstances, that the courts should know that Congress
expects them not to hold officers or associations liable for the unlawful acts of a member without
H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1932).
clear proof ....
54. 330 U.S. at 401-06.
55. "We hold that its [§ 6] purpose and effect was to relieve organizations . . . from
liability for damages or imputation of guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by some
330 U.S. at 403.
individual officers or members of the organization, without clear proof .
56.

See note 50 supra.

57. 383 U.S. at 736-37.
58. "in most cases where strikes occur involving a great many employers and employees
.. . there are often unlawful acts committed in the way of injury to property or to persons. ...
In case of a strike, where the officers of the labor union are doing everything within their power
to prevent acts of violence from being committed by any person, the law should fully protect
them.
... S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1932).
59.

See note 55 supra.
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"[p]lainly, § 6 applies to federal court adjudications of state tort
claims arising out of labor disputes. . . ."I' If Congress intended
section 6 to be applied only to these acts, then the "clear proof"
standard cannot be validly utilized to test all elements of a union's
liability for a Sherman Act violation.6
Assuming antitrust conspiracies were intended to be a type of act
within the phrase "unlawful acts," and that based on congressional
intent the "clear proof" test is inapplicable to all issues in union
antitrust cases, 62 the need for a solution becomes apparent. It is
proposed that union antitrust cases should involve a two part analysis.
First, was there an unlawful act, a conspiracy, committed by anyone?
The preponderance of evidence test must govern this aspect of the case.
Secondly, was the unlawful act ratified, participated in, or authorized
by the union? Only in this part of the court's decision will the "clear
proof" rule be relevant. A two part approach has already been
implicitly recognized," but must be implemented by all courts. If the
instant court had adopted the suggested procedure, the practical result
would have been to find the UMW liable because the district court
judge admitted that if the preponderance of evidence test were applied,
the union's conspiracy had been established.64 The union's
authorization or ratification would then be tested by "clear proof,"
and even though it requires more kroof than a preponderance of
evidence, there is little doubt that the UMW authorized its officials to
act in the manner they did.65 Because the Sixth Circuit realized in
60. 383 U.S. at 737 (emphasis added).
61. A possible response to this argument is that property damage and personal injury are
elements of a conspiracy, so the "clear proof" rule should be applied to test the conspiracy (the
allegedly illegal acts) as a whole. Congress, however, assumed an unlawful act was present and
did not intend § 6 to test the illegality itself.
62. Scholars have recognized that § 6 was not intended to dictate the standard of proof
in a union antitrust case. E.g., Comment, supra note 24, at 265 n.62.
63. See note 35 supra; Brief for Plaintiff at 38-39, Ramsey v. UMW, 416 F.2d 655 (6th
Cir. 1969). A rebuttal to this two part analysis would be based on the theory that a union acts
only through its agents; therefore, when a conspiracy is proved, the agency relation is also proved.
Consequently, the "clear proof" test should be applied to finding a conspiracy. The fallacy in
this reasoning lies in congressional intent which never suggested that the unlawful act itself be
tested by "clear proof." See notes 52 & 55 supra. A second alternative suggests proving the illegal
act or conspiracy by "clear proof" and the union's ratification by a preponderance of evidence.
This approach, however, has two weaknesses: (I) congressional intent militates against
applying § 6 in proving an illegal act; and (2) § 6 states that the union's authorization of an
illegal act must be shown by "clear proof." See note 6 supra.
64. Text accompanying note 30 supra.
65. If sufficient acts are present in any situation to find a conspiracy and the acts were
authorized by the union, there must also be proof of an unreasonable restraint of trade or
commerce. If the restraint is not unreasonable, there has not been a Sherman Act violation. The
test for unreasonableness is based on what other courts have found to be unreasonable under
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Tennessee Consolidated the necessity for a two part approach only one
week before their decision in Ramsey," it is difficult to rationalize why
the same court refused to apply a dual analysis in that case. Although

the Sixth Circuit engaged in a subversion of legislative intent in
Ramsey, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to delineate a more
viable interpretation of the scope of the "clear proof" standard. In
Pennington II, the Court could have resolved the.issue, but left no
precise guidelines because three different judges offered opinions.

Ramsey presents a medium in which the Court can clarify the
confusion which persists over its holding in Pennington 117 and limit

the scope of section 6.8 Regardless of whether the Court rules in favor
of the preponderance of evidence or "clear proof" test, the problem

will still remain of allowing judges and juries to bring their prejudices
into collective bargaining controversies. To avoid giving judges and
juries too much leeway in this complex field, the best solution is for
Congress to issue a "clear delineation of prohibited employer-union
relationships."0 Even if the Court refuses to explain Pennington H and

clarify when the "clear proof" standard governs, this denial of
certiorari may be a suggestion that Congress take action to eliminate

subsequent misinterpretation of section 6. In any case, the
similar restrictive situations. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918).
66. See note 35 supra. The UMW's filing of a petition to rehear en banc in Tennessee
Consolidated suggests they hope to reverse the three judge panel's decision, just as was done in
Ramsey. This result seems doubtful as long as the Sixth Circuit will again note that the "clear
proor' test is not meant to determine the illegality of an act.
67. For an example of the confusion, compare the interpretation of the holding of
Pennington H in Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 814 (6th Cir. 1968) ("clear proof" stated
as part of holding), with Ramsey v. UMV, 265 F. Supp. 388, 398 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) (no mention
of "clear proof").
68. The Supreme Court could also decide whether predatory intent is necessary to violate
the Sherman Act. The opinions in Pennington H failed to agree on this question and numerous
courts have already attempted to answer the question. E.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
334 U.S. 495, 525 (1948); United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913).
69. 43 TExAs L. REV. 1122, 1126 (1965). Such legislation might place the NLRB in charge
of union antitrust litigation. Compare Cox & Dunlop, Regulation Of Collective Bargaining By
The National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REv. 389 (1950), with Comment, UnionEmployer Agreements And The Antitrust Laws: The Pennington And Jewel Tea Cases, 114 U.
PA. L. REV. 901,931-37 (1966).
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implementation of the proposed two part approach demands that the

courts and Congress recognize the inherent limitations of the "clear
70
proof" rule.

Antitrust-Robinson-Patman Act-Private Litigants Need Not
Show Consequential Damages in Order to Recover Treble
Damages for Price Discrimination Violations
Alleging price discriminations' in violation of the RobinsonPatman amendment to the Clayton Act,2 plaintiffs brought a private
antitrust suit' against a supplier. The trial court found the plaintiffs
had suffered a direct business injury as a result of the discriminations,
and that the amount thereof could be made the measure of a general
damage award.4 The defendant contended that this was an improper
measure of damages and that the plaintiff must prove special or
consequential damages5 before being entitled to recovery. On appeal to

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, held, affirmed. Where plaintiff has
established that he has been charged illegally discriminatory prices, the
unjustified discrimination is a direct business injury, and the amount
thereof is the measure of a general damage award. Fowler Mfg. Co.
v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969).
70. The necessity for legislation has often been recognized. E.g., Cox, Labor ,,lnd The
Antitrust Laws-A PreliminaryAnalysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252 (1955); Meltzer, Labor Unions,
Collective Bargaining, And The Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHi. L. REv. 659 (1965); Winter,
Collective BargainingAnd Competition: The Application Of Antitrust Standards To Union
Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963). Congress has already considered specific bills in this area. Eg.,
Meltzer, supra at 660 n.4; Note, Jewel Tea & Pennington- Collective Bargaining Under the
Antitrust Laws, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 156, 175 n.99 (1966). Other possible statutes have been
proposed outside Congress. E.g., Cox, supra at 279-84.
.1. Defendant Fowler had sold electric water heaters to the three principal business
competitors of plaintiff Thrifty at prices below what it had charged Thrifty.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition ....
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) (allows any person injured in his business or property by an
antitrust violation to sue and collect treble damages); see note 31 infra.
4. The amount of "general damages" is the difference between the price charged a plaintiff
and that charged his competitors, multiplied by the volume of goods purchased by a plaintiff at
the discriminatory price.
5. Special or consequential damages are those suffered by a plaintiff through loss of
business or profits as a result of the discrimination.
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The Clayton Act,' which was passed in 1914 to supplement7 the
Sherman Act,8 proscribes certain types of price discrimination. Section
two of the Act, however, confained a "good faith to meet
competition"' proviso which for twenty years made the Act virtually
ineffective against price discrimination violations. 0 A Federal Trade
Commission report confirmed this finding" arkd recommended that the
law be amended. 2 In response to this report, separate bills 3 were

introduced in both Houses of Congress. The Senate bill, as originally
passed, created a statutory presumption that the measure of damages
was the pecuniary amount of the prohibited discrimination." The

House bill, however, contained no provision for a measure of
damages. 5 The issue was resolved in the conference committee of the

two houses, and the statute as finally enacted contained no provisions
for measuring damages. 6 The question whether general or
consequential damages should be the measure of recovery in a private
suit under the Robinson-Patman Act has not been adjudicated by the

Supreme Court. The lower federal courts have divided on the issue, and
even within the circuits the districts are split. In Elizabeth Arden Sales
Corp. v. Gus Blass Co.,' 7 the Eighth Circuit held that the presence of
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964).
7. "[W]e are not amending the Sherman law. We are merely supplementing it by additional
legislation . . . [i]n
the interest of harmony, and especially when there is no objection to the
Sherman law . . . [w]hy have one rule in the original Sherman law as it is written and another
rule in the supplemental provisions .......
51 CONG. REC. 9417 (1914) (remarks of
Representative Floyd).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
9. "[N]othing herein . . .shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers of
commodities . . . or discrimination in price in the same or different communities made in good
faith to meet competition." Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730.
10. W. PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE To THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 7 (1963).
II.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION, S.

Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., IstSess. 90 (1934).
12. Id. at 96-97.
13. S. 3154, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), cited in W. PATMAN, supra note 10, app. C, at
283; H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), citedin W. PATMAN, supra note 10, app. C, at 306.
14. "For purposes of suit under section 4 of this Act, the measure of damages from any
violation of this section shall, in the absence of proof of greater damage, be presumed to be the
unit amount of the prohibited discrimination.
...
S. 3154, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(d) (1936).
The Senate report accompanying the bill stated that the presumptive rule for the measure of
damages would serve as a deterrent to violators and enable victims of the discriminations to avoid
the difficulties of proving business loss. S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
15. H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
16. The conference report deleting § 2(d) of the Senate bill provided: "[T]he Senate bill
set up a new measure of damages for violations of the law, whereas the House bill left the damages
to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the existing Clayton Act. The Senate
receded." H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
17. 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,326 U.S. 773 (1945).
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an illegal price discrimination constituted the necessary business injury
and that the amount of discrimination could properly be made the
measure of a general damage award.18 The court reasoned that a
damage statute should be read in relation to the intent and policy of

the Act of which it is a part. 9 They interpreted the Robinson-Patman
Act as requiring that anything furnished to one customer should be

furnished to another on proportionately equal terms. The court found
no reason under the language or policy, of the statute for not
compelling the seller to do what he is required to do by allowing
recovery of general damages.2 0 Although the majority adopted a
general damage standard, they conceded that there are some kinds of

discrimination which preclude an award of general damages.2' The
Second Circuit in Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co.,22 took a
contrary position when it reversed a district court decision 23 allowing
general damages. Enterprise held that no general damage award is
authorized under the Act and that the customer must prove
24
consequential damage to his business in loss of profits and customers.
The majority relied in part upon its previous decision in Sun Cosnetic2l
and in part upon its interpretation of the legislative history of the
Robinson-Patman Act. The court reasoned that since proof of the price
discrimination places the burden of showing price justification upon the
party charged with the violation, 26 it would unduly prejudice the
18. But see American Can Co.v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 195 1).
19. 150 F.2d at 995.
20. fd. at 996.
21. Although the court did not point out any characteristic features by which a general
damage situation can be distinguished from-a consequential damage situation, they provided the
following example: "[A] discriminatory allowance of funds to a customer, to be used by him solely
in advertising or promoting business in the seller's goods, would perhaps not furnish a basis for
general damages, since the injury to a competitor probably would depend upon the results which
the advertising funds produced . . . .Again, under subsection (c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(c), which
prohibits the granting of any commission or brokerage by a seller to any customer or his agent, no
general damage right would probably exist .... Id. at 996.
22. 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
23. Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420 (D.Conn. 1955).
24. In reaching this conclusion the court referred to the reasoning of Justice Cardozo
concerning the proper way to measure damages: "If by reason of the discrimination, the preferred
producers have been able to divert business that would otherwise have gone to the disfavored
shipper, damage has resulted to the extent of the diverted profits. If the effect of the discrimination
has been to force the shipper to sell at a lowered.., price. . . damage has resulted to the extent
of the reduction. But none of these consequences is a necessary inference from discrimination
without more." ICC v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1933).
25. Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1946).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964) (originally enacted as § 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act).

197d]

RECENT CASES

defendant to presume that the amount of the discrimination reflects the
amount of business injury. This would require the defendant to prove,
from facts at the disposal of the plaintiff, that there was no loss of
business or profits as a result of the discrimination. 2 The majority
concluded that if Congress had intended to place a defendant at such
a drastic procedural disadvantage, the general damage standard would
not have been deleted from the original Senate bill. The court, however,
indicated that if a buyer has been charged a discriminatory price and
there is evidence that he has not passed this expense on to the consumer
but has absorbed it himself, then the facts may show the amount of
the discrimination to be the proper measure of the buyer's business
damage.18 Although the Supreme Court has not decided the issue, in
dictum in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co. 2 answering the
buyer's complaint that there would be no relief available unless the
Court allowed him to disaffirm the sale, the majority suggested that if
he showed the prices to be discriminatory, he would be able to recover
three times the amount of the discrimination
In the instant case, the court found that the unjustified price
discrimination caused a direct business injury, and that the RobinsonPatman Act did not require a plaintiff to prove his damage through a
showing of lost profits or business. Therefore, the court concluded that
the Act allowed the illegal price discrimination to be the basis for
recovery and that the amount of the discrimination is the measure of
a general damage award.
The private enforcement section of the Clayton Act requires that
a person be injured in his business in order to recover for a violation
of the antitrust laws. This court applied a general damage standard
which equates the price discrimination with the required business
injury. This interpretation seems to violate the congressional intent and
the language of the private enforcement section of the Clayton Act,
under which suits for violation of the Robinson-Patman Act are
instituted. When the Robinson-Patman amendment to Clayton was
enacted, Congress left undisturbed the pre-existing section allowing
27. 240 F.2d at 460.
28. Id. at 459.
29. 330 U.S. 743 (1947).
30. Id. at 757. The question then before the Court was whether discrimination should bar
a seller from recovering the contract price. See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F.
Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), affd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951), petitionfor cert. dismissed, 342
U.S. 875 (1951) (in a private enforcement suit the court appeared to apply the general damage

standard).
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private recovery 3 ' This section had been re-enacted with only minor
changes from section seven of the Sherman Act. 32 In passing the

Clayton Act, Congress apparently meant to limit recovery to the
Sherman Act concept of actual business injury. 33 The RobinsonPatman Act was intended to strengthen and close the loopholes in

section 2 of the Clayton Act. 34 It did not alter the section allowing
private recovery in any way, and Congress rejected the Senate's
attempt to set up the general damage standard as a new measure of
damages. 35 As the dissent pointed out, the Arden decision fails to

justify the grant of general damages in the light of the legislative

history of the Act. 36 The adoption of a general damage standard fails
to correlate legislative intent with economic reality. A buyer who is

discriminated against in prices may pass that price increase on to the
ultimate consumer, and thereby eliminate any direct business injury.

Price variation among competing merchants is an integral part of our
economic system and must be considered if the clear language of the

Act is to be followed. If in a given case a merchant is charged a higher
discriminatory price, and he absorbs this increase rather than passing
it on, a direct business injury has occurred. In 'this situation, the
amount of price discrimination reflects actual business injury. This
does not justify approval of a general damage award. The amount of

discrimination is recoverable only because it happens to be the measure
of consequential damages.3 The cases and authorities advancing the
31. "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United States in the
district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount
in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of Oct.
15, 1914, ch. 323, § 4,38 Stat. 731).
32. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890).
33. - See 51 CONG. REc. 9073 (1914); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251
(1946); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922); cf. 51 CONG. REc. 9261 (1914).
Contra, Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 756 (1947) (dictum that
Sherman Act case law does not fit Robinson-Patman cases). See generally Clark, The Treble
Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages In Private AntitrustSuits, 52 Micti. L. REv. 363,
406-11 (1954); 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 329.
34. "Mr. GORE. I desire to ask the Senator whether the general purpose and object of
the pending bill are to strengthen the provisions of section 2 of the Clayton Act, and to stop the
loopholes and correct the abuses which time and experience have developed and disclosed in that
legislation? Mr. LOGAN. I say to the Senator that the bill has no other purpose . . . the bill
has three things in view, all aimed at strengthening the Clayton Act." 80 CONG. REc. 3115 (1936).
35. See note 19 supra.
36. 150 F.2d at 996-97.
37. The opinion in the instant case does not contain enough information to ascertain
whether this was the situation upon which the court based its award of general damages.
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general damage approach have argued that to require a plaintiff to
prove damages through loss of business and profits is an almost

insurmountable barrier to success in a suit.38 This argument has
become less persuasive since the lack of precise proof of the amount

of damage no longer blocks recovery in a private antitrust action in
federal courts

9

The principle which precludes recovery of uncertain

damages only applies to the situation in which the violation is not
definitely shown to be the proximate cause of the damage; it does not
prohibit recovery when only the amount of the damage is uncertain.4
Recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated a trend towards
encouraging private enforcement suits under the Robinson-Patman

Act. The decision in the present case does not detract from this trend
since the injured party is not required to specifically prove the amount

of his damages.
Although it may be more difficult for a plaintiff to prove special
damages, it is not an unreasonable requirment. To require less puts the

defendant under the unjustifiable burden of disproving all the specific
elements of plaintiff's case; it ignores the fact that the private action

is only one means of enforcing the prohibition against price
discrimination;4 and it conflicts with the intent of Congress as reflected

by the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Antitrust Remedies-State Given Standing to Sue as Parens
Patriae
The State of Hawaii, alleging a combination and conspiracy in

restraint of trade' and damage to the State in its proprietary capacity,
38. See Barber, Private Enforcement Of The Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patnian
Experience, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181, 210-18 (1961).
39. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Flintkote Co. v.
Lystjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
40. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931); see
TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS

§ 20.02, at 289-93 (1965).

41. The primary means of enforcement is a suit by the Federal Trade Commission. After
finding that there has been illegal discrimination, theCommission will issue a cease and desist
order.
I. Plaintiffs fourth amended complaint alleged that defendant's bid rigging, price fixing,
market monopolization, and other acts in restraint of trade were in violation of §§ I and 2 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964): (1) "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
... (2) "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
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filed a treble damages complaint against three oil companies. Plaintiff,
acting in its parenspatriaecapacity,2 alleged injury to the economy and
prosperity of the State of Hawaii 3 and sought damages for and
injunctive relief against the antitrust violations. As to the parens
patriae action, defendants moved to dismiss, urging that a state could
not recover damages as parens patriae' and that no injury had been
alleged. 5 On motion in the United States District Court for the District
of Hawaii, held, for the plaintiff. Within the context of the antitrust
acts, a state has standing to sue for damages and injunctive relief as
parens patriae when defendant's acts adversely affect a substantial
number of a state's citizenry and the general economy and prosperity
of the state. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii
1969).
In examining the nature of a state's ability to sue as parens
patriae,the Supreme Court has closely scrutinized petitioner's standing
in each case. To qualify for the Court's original jurisdiction, a state
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court."
2. The parens patriae or quasi-sovereign capacity is one in which a state asserts its position
as agent and protector of all its citizens in behalf of their general welfare. Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 324 U.S. 439,443-44 (1945).
3. The specific injuries alleged are as follows: "(a) revenues of its citizens have been
wrongfully extracted from the State of Hawaii; (b) taxes affecting the citizens and commercial
entities have been increased to affect such losses of revenues and income; (c) opportunity in
manufacturing, shipping and commerce have been restricted and curtailed; (d) the full and
complete utilization of the natural wealth of the State has been prevented; (e) the high cost of
manufacture in Hawaii has precluded goods made there from equal competitive access with those
of other States to the national market; (f) measures taken by the State to promote the general
progress and welfare of its people have been frustrated; (g) the Hawaii economy has been held in
a state of arrested development." Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982, 983-84 (D.
Hawaii 1969). Plaintiff also alleged that the precise extent of the damage has not yet been ascertained and it requests leave to insert such sum when determined. Id.
4. Defendant specifically alleged that a parens patriaesuit is not maintainable under § 4
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964): "Any person who shall be injured in his businss or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
5. Other grounds asserted for dismissal were that: (a) there can never be a parens patriae
suit for damages; (b) there would be created the risk of double recovery for damages recoverable
by both the State and individual citizens; (c) damages under the antitrust laws will not lie because
an injury to the State's sovereignty is by its very nature too remote or speculative to be measured
in money damages. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982, 984 (D. Hawaii 1969).
6. "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consults, and those in
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must be a true party in inteiest, and the suit must be free of the
eleventh amendment's bar against a state's being sued by the citizens
of another state. 7 As a result, the Court has disallowed suits as parens
patriae when one state sued another in order to collect debts owed to
its citizens8 or when it found a state was suing primarily in behalf of
particular creditors and depositors of a state bank.? In Oklahoma v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 10 the state sued to cancel railroad rates set
by a federal statute. The use of parens patriae was severely restricted
by the Court's holding that individual shippers could have brought
essentially the same suit and that the state had no direct property
interest at stake. Therefore, inadequate grounds existed for granting
original jurisdiction.11 On the other hand, states have been allowed to
bring parenspatriaesuits when it was found that the state had a quasi2
sovereign interest in the comfort, health, and prosperity of its citizens.1
A state suing as parens patriae must act for the benefit of the public
as a whole and not for the benefit of defined individuals.' 3 Standing to
recover damages for economic injury was allowed first in Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R.14 The decision brought new breadth to the parens
patriae doctrine by allowing Georgia to enforce the civil sanctions of
the antitrust laws. The Court considered the state to be a "person"
within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act, 5 and the asserted
claims were deemed to be an injury distinct from any damage suffered
which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2.
7. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
8. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (citizen-bondholders of New
Hampshire were the real parties in interest, thereby falling within the eleventh amendment
prohibition).
9. Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938) (without a direct interest the
state was not a real party).
10. 220 U.S. 277 (1911).
11. "Ve are of the opinion that the words, in the Constitution, conferring original
jurisdiction on this court, in a suit 'in which a State shall be a party,' are not to be interpreted
as conferring such jurisdiction in every cause in which the State elects to make itself strictly a
party plaintiff of record and seeks not to protect its own property, but only to vindicate the
wrongs of some of its people or to enforce its own laws or public policy against wrongdoers,
generally." Id. at 289.
12. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
13. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (damages averred by the state do
not have to threaten all of the state's inhabitants or all of them in like degree).
14. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). The Court found that there was no apparent reason why states
should be excluded from the purview of the antitrust laws. 324 U.S. at 452.
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by individual citizens. 6 Although Georgia was not allowed to recover
its alleged damages, 7 a precedent was set for giving states standing to
sue as parens patriae in order to redress economic injury inflicted by
antitrust violations.
In determining the state's legal standing to sue, the district court
held in the instant case that Hawaii's complaint met the two
prerequisites of a parens patriae suit: (1) the state alleged an interest
independent of its citizens rather than seeking to recover for individual
citizen-claimants; and (2) a substantial number of the state's
inhabitants were adversely affected by the alleged acts of the
defendants. 8 As to the propriety of the state's claim for parenspatriae
standing in an antitrust action, the court found Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R.19 to be determinative of the principle that a state is
a "person" within the meaning of the antitrust provisions and can sue
to recover damages for injuries to the general economy. Defendants'
argument that economic injury was not injury to "business or
property" within section 4 of the Clayton Act"0 was met by the court's
conclusion that if the economy of a state may be injured, then
"economy" is finite and within the broad definition of property. The
specific allegations of plaintiff's complant2 l were not so remote and
speculative as to render the complaint insufficient or the damages
immeasurable. The assertion of possible double recovery was also
denied by the court's recognition of a parens patriae action as redress
for only that injury completely severable from damages recoverable by
individual citizens.
The court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss was
appropriate in light of available precedent. The Georgia case' made it
16. 324 U.S. at 447-48; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
17. Even if the alleged conspiracy or restraint of trade did exist, under the holding of Keogh
v. Chicago & N.W.Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), rates approved by the I.C.C. must be considered

legal. 324 U.S. at 453.
18. The court judicially noticed that 300,000 motor vehicles are owned by Hawaii's 800,000
inhabitants. Furthermore, "[i]f more facts were needed, in this State where the grass never ceased
to grow, gasoline-powered lawn mowers are as thick as the proverbial fleas on a dog. These two
categories, of course, do not cover all of the engines in Hawaii that are powered by petroleum

products. The court would judicially notice that there is probably not a single industry nor more
than an insignificant number of persons in Hawaii whose operations, life and livelihood are not
connected in some way with, or affected by, the use of gasoline fuel and the other petroleum
products referred to in the present complaint, and perforce therefore, the cost thereof." 301 F.
Supp. at 987.
19. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
20. See note 4 supra.
21. See note 3 supra.
22. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
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clear that a state has the ability to enforce the civil sanctions of the
antitrust laws" and directly implied that a suit in parens patriae for
damages was allowable. 24 There is analytical difficulty in classifying a
state's economy as property, but a broad definition of property, which
traditionally has included other intangibles such as business goodwill,
does not seem unreasonable. Furthermore, the strong countervailing
considerations2 5 that have often led the Supreme Court to deny
standing in certain parens patriae suits are not present in this case.
Therefore, as a policy matter, no reason exists for refusing the state
an opportunity to prove damage to its economy. The conceptual proof,
however, demonstrating some reasonable inference of amount of
damage, is a formidable obstacle for the state,26 since the theory of
parens patriae as delineated by the district court presupposes the need
to show injury completely severable from individual damages.2 1
The proof of damages entails the use of economic theory to
approximate injury to the economy apart from direct injuries measured
by overcharges. The basic premise is that had it not been for
defendants' price-fixing activities, the citizens of Hawaii would have
had extra dollars2 to allocate between spending for consumption 29 and
holding for savings." These withheld extra dollars would have had an
23. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
24. "Georgia, suing for her own injuries is a 'person' within the meaning of § 16 of the
Clayton Act; she is authorized to maintain suits to restrain violations of the anti-trust laws or to
recover damages by reason thereof. . . . But Georgia is not confined to suits designed to protect
only her proprietary interest." 324 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added).
25. The state is not here seeking either original jurisdiction by the Supreme Court or suit
against another state within the eleventh amendment prohibition. See notes 6 & 7 supra and
accompanying text.
26. Practical evidence of this difficulty is shown by: (a) the State of Hawaii did not allege
a monetary sum for damages, see note 3 supra; (b) the brief for the State of Georgia admitted
that such damage is perhaps incapable of estimate in money; Brief for Complainant at 7, Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
27. "If the State cannot prove injury to the State's economy-an injury completely
severable from the injuries to its individual inhabitants, then of course it could recover no money
damages." 301 F. Supp. at 988.
28. The amount of these extra dollars could be determined by finding the difference between
the cost per unit as actually sold and the cost per unit under competitive prices and multiplying
by the number of units sold in Hawaii by the defendants. The only offset would be the Hawaiian
stockholders' share of the companies' greater profit.
29. The extra percentage amount that will be spent on consumption if people are given an
extra dollar of income is known as the "marginal propensity to consume" (MPC) and can be
determined by reference to typical consumption schedules. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS, AN
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 265-66 fig. I (2nd ed. 1951).
30. The fraction of each extra dollar that goes to savings instead of consumption is known
as the "marginal propensity to save" (MPS) and can be determined by a consumption schedule.
Id. at 265-67.
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effect on the economy of the state over and above the direct injury to
the overcharged individuals. It is a well established principle of
economic theory that an increase in net spending (the extra dollars) will
increase overall income by a multiplied amount-by an amount greater
than itself.31 This amplified effect of changes in spending on income is
called the "multiplier" doctrine, 32 and depending on what percent of

each extra dollar of income is spent for consumption, 33 the ecohomy is
affected by a change in income greater than the total amount of the
overcharge.34 Such a multiplied increase in income less the aggregate
individual overcharges would, therefore, when multiplied by the ratio
of aggregate spending within the state to total spending, be a measure
31. Id. at 280.
32. The word "multiplier" is the term used for the numerical coefficient showing how great
an increase in income results from each increase in spending. For example, if an increase of $5
billion causes an increase of income of $15 billion, then the multiplier is 3. Id.
33. This percentage is known as the MPC. See note 29 supra. Technically, the change in
income will be equal to: I + (I-MPG) multiplied by extra dollars invested. P. SANIULSON, supra
note 29, at 282.
34. The practical effect of the multiplier can be better shown by an example. If a person
hires unemployed resources to build a $1,000 garage, there will be a secondary expansion of
income over and above the primary investment. The building contractor will get an extra $1,000
of income, but that is not the end of the story. If he is assumed to have a marginal propensity
to consume of 2/3, he will now spend $666.67 on new consumption goods. The producers of these
goods will now have an extra income of $666.67. If their MPC is also 2/3, they in turn will spend
$444.44 or 2/3 of $666.67 (or 2/3 of 2/3 of $1,000). So the process goes on, with each new round
of spending being 2/3 of the previous round. An endless chain of secondary consumption
respending is set up by the primary $1,000 of investment spending; however, it is a dwindling
chain which all adds up to a finite amount. By either arithmetic or geometric progression,* we
get:

$1,000.00

1 X $1,000

666.67
+

2/3 X $1,000
+

444.44
+

(2/3)2 X $1,000
+

295.29
+

(2/3)

197.53
+

2,999.9999
or
$3,000.00

3

X $1,000
+

(2/3)

4

X $1,000
-+

I
1-2/3

X $1,000 or 3 X $1,000
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of the economic injury sustained by the State's economy as a result of
35
the discriminatory rates.
The overall policy considerations of the antitrust laws should also
be considered. As evidenced by the treble damages provision of the
Clayton Act,3" the policy of antitrust legislation is to deter illegal
combinations and conspiracies by severely punishing the violators.
Therefore, the remedy against such wrongdoers should be an effective,
strong deterrent. The enticement of multi-million dollar price-fixing
arrangements is not likely to be prohibited unless treble damages are
recoverable by some injured party. Damages to individual consumers,
however, usually involve only small sums, although the aggregate
overcharges make for quite lucrative profiteering on the part of the
wrongdoers. The individual amounts in controversy are usually not
sufficient to make piecemeal litigation economically feasible.3 7 A
method of aggregating valid overcharge claims would partially solve
the effective remedy problem by allowing the employment of qualified
counsel at reduced cost to individuals.38 In view of the nature of a

state's parens patriae capacity-as guardian of its citizens' welfare-a
suit by the state to recover the damages of its consumer citizens would

be an appropriate remedy were it not for the instant court's insistence
on the state's having an interest independent of its citizens.-9 Another

remedial approach would involve a typical class action, wherein the
state could sue for damages both as the entity injured in its business
and property and as the representative of a class as defined by Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 0 Such a state represented
*The formula for an infinite geometric progression is:
I + r + r2 + r3 + r4 + ...

+ r n +...=

1
l-r

as long as r is less than I in absolute value. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 29, at 281. An analogous
discussion of the multiplier is set forth in SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS, AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS
246-69 (1961).
35. This theory of proof should not, however, be considered a substitute for the amassing
of any available probative statistics showing the deterrent effect of discriminatory petroleum
prices upon the location of new business or industry in Hawaii. Proof of damages of this sort, as
alleged, would also be free of any double recovery taint since individual citizens are not given
standing to protest such injuries.
36. Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). See note 4 supra.
37. Wade & Kamenshine, Restitution for Defrauded Consumers, 37 Gao. WASH. L. REv.
1031, 1048 (1969).
38. Unfortunately, courts have rarely allowed such actions. Id.at 1049 n.1 13.
39. As was seen above, the reasons for disallowing a parens patriae action in the context
of a Supreme Court decision are not present in this situation. See note 24 supra.
40. It is interesting to note that in the instant case such a state represented class action
was dismissed by an oral bench decision of the court. 301 F. Supp. at 984 n.3. The basis for the
dismissal probably involved administrative difficulties in defining the class and giving notice as
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class action would seemingly be an appropriate conduit" for
administering the large-scale recovery.42 Either approach could,

however, effectuate antitrust policies by providing both restitution to
consumers and punishment to the wrongdoers.13 Problems of

administration of such a suit and determination of the proper legal
theory as to the cause of action should not prohibit a state's seeking
justice for its injured inhabitants, who are themselves without a
practical remedy. Even given the framework of the present allowable
cause of action to recover for damages to the state's economy, a state
represented consumer class action44 could be a helpful adjunct. The
class action would provide a probative basis for determining the
monetary residue" deductible from the total economic damage (the
"multiplied" increase) in order to prevent a double recovery, yet allow
a restitution to the victims and a strong deterrent-punishment to the

wrongdoer.
well as the state's claim of injury not being typical of the class. See Joint Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Motion to Dismiss Class Action-Count Three of Third Amended Complaint
at 8-20, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969).
41. The attributes of a class action, making it pgpropriate for this type of consumer
remedy, have been articulated by the Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d
555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968): "Class actions serve an important function in our judicial system. By
establishing a technique whereby the claims of many individuals can be resolved at the same time,
the class suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small claimants
with a method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant
individual litigation."
42. The total sum recovered by the class suit could be returned by the state to the injured
individuals on a pro rata basis. For guidelines to administering such a massive recovery, the court
could look to the recent consent settlement against several major drug companies. See Wade &
Kamershine, supra note 37, at 1031, 1055 & n.153; Order Directing Escrow of Funds by
Defendants.
43. As it appears from the argument, plaintiff was merely seeking consumer restitution
under either theory available. "Finally, in Count ii and Count Ill, plaintiff is properly seeking
compensation (either as trustee-parenspatriae, or as representative of a class) for the widespread
economic injuries which defendants' illegal pricing practice caused to purchasers of refined
petroleum products and asphalt." Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motions Directed to the Third Amended Complaint at 28, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F.
Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969).
44. The class action suit should be brought while the present suit is pending.
45. Presumably the class action recovery would approximate the aggregate individual
overcharges.
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Civil Rights-State Action Not Required Under Sections 1981,
1982, and 1985(3) of Title 42; Action "Under Color of State
Constitutional Right" Satisfies the "Color of Law" Requirement
of Section 1983
Plaintiffs, parishioners and officials of St. Louis Cathedral Parish,
brought a class action in federal district court against two groups of
militant demonstrators, seeking injunctive relief to prohibit the
threatened recurrence of previous disruptive activities by defendants.'
On four of five consecutive Sundays, defendants entered plaintiffs'
church in an organized, militant fashion, completely disrupted services,
and made threatening demands, copies of which were distributed
throughout the congregation. 2 Defendants warned of further
"shocking" demonstrations in the church unless their demands were
met. 3 Plaintiffs contended that defendants, acting under color of state
law, violated certain rights and privileges secured to plaintiffs by the
United States Constitution and laws, and that plaintiffs might properly
4
have redress under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code.
Plaintiffs further alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1982,
and 1985(3).5 On motion for preliminary injunction, held, granted.
I. Plaintiffs included-the pastor of St. Louis Cathedral Parish, the Archbishop of St. Louis,
as holder of legal title to the church propertty, and certain parishioners, acting individually and
on behalf of all other parishioners of St. Louis Cathedral Parish. The 2 defendants, Action and
Black Liberation Front, are voluntary and unincorporated associations.
2. The size of the group ranged from 29 to 12; at least 5 demonstrators entered the church
on each occasion; those entering the church retained contact with their cohorts outside (whom
the court characterized as a "guerilla force") via walkie-talkie equipment. The material passed
out to the congregation read in part as follows: "Action's 'BLACK SUNDAYS' at this church
will' tke place without further warning. If you're present, of course, you'll become involved-a
very s iocking experience!
'IBLACK SUNDAYS,' phase two, will take on various forms of uniqueness, such as
spittig in the communion cup during communion service, a symbollic gesture of changing wine
back lo water and/or taking the holy bread from the Reverend and distributing it to the Black
poor," Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240, 1242 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
3. Defendants demanded "that all properties . . . be made public;" that the church act as
a non-profit bonding agency for blacks; that the church take public disciplinary action against
certain policemen who were its members; that the church divest itself of specified investments;
that 75% of the church's "monies take" be turned over to Action; and, that certain action be
taken with regard to rent strikes.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964): "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964): "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
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Demonstrators who entered a church for the purpose and with the
result of causing disorder and disruption acted under color of state law,

within the ambit of 42 U.S.C. section 1983, and are amenable to suit
under that section, as well as under sections 1981, 1982, and 1985(3).
Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1969).

The present sections 1981 and 1982 were initially enacted as
section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.6 From their inception, these

sections have been read to apply only to state action. That limitation
is traceable to the Civil Rights Cases,7 which held that the fourteenth

amendment's first section was directed only at state action. One
justification for applying the state action limitation to the statutes was
that Congress proposed the fourteenth amendment shortly after it
passed the 1866 Act, thereby incorporating the Act into the
amendment. A second theory was that a "re-enactment" of the 1866

Act in 1870, after ratification of the fourteenth amendment, imposed
the state action limitation on the 1866 Act.8 In 1948, the Supreme
Court suggested that application of section 1982 was limited to
discriminatory state action, in view of the scope and purposes of the
fourteenth amendment.9 This approach came to an abrupt end in Jones
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."
42 U.S.C. -§ 1982 (1964): "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property."
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1964): "if two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or
go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving.. .
any person or class of pesons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privilges and
immunities under the laws . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more
persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived
may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against
any one or more of the conspirators."
6. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982
(1964)). The original § I read as follows: "[C]itizens, of every race and color . . . shall have
the same right in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments,
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the
contrary notwithstanding." Compare the above language with that of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982,
supra note 5.
7. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
8. For discussion of the theories and a general study of the 1866 Act, see Kohl, The Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Its Hour Come Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L.
REV.

272 (1969).

9. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31-32 (1948). Although purely dicta, the lower federal
courts accepted it as an emphatic pronouncement.
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v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,10 in which the Court extended the coverage
of section 1982 to private, as well as public, discrimination in the sale

of property. This expansive interpretation was seen as a valid exercise
of congressional power to enforce the thirteenth amendment."
Although Jones was expressly limited to section 198212 the Court's

discussion of the legislative history was in terms of section 1 of the
1866 Act, which included the present section 198 1.13 Three months after
Jones, in Dobbins v. Local 212, InternationalBrotherhoodof Electrical

Workers, 4 an Ohio district court applied the Jones rationale and held
that state action was not a necessary factor under section 198 1.'1
The state action requirement as applied to section 1985 (3)16 seems
a more permanent fixture; since Collins v. Hardyman,' 7 the state action

concept under section 1985(3) has repeatedly been upheld." In Collins,
the Court noted that section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 18711" was

enacted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment and held that section
1985(3) necessarily embodied the amendment's state action
10. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
1I. Justice Stewart's majority opinion provides a detailed analysis of the legislative history
and the socio-political environment behind the 1866 Act. Through this analytical process the
Court determined that the fourteenth amendment's state action limitation was inapplicable
to § 1982. The Court distinguished Hurd, stating that it was not a case of "purely private"
discrimination. 392 U.S. at 419. The Court noted that the only federal court to previously
confront the "purely private" discrimination question had allowed a suit under § 1982. United
States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903).
12. 392 U.S. at 413. "We hold that § 1982 bars all racial discrimination .
13. Id. at 422-36. See note 6 supra for text of § I.
14. 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). Dobbins, a Negro, brought an action against a
union for its refusal to allow him membership because of his race. Noting the close relationship
between union membership and Dobbins' ability to contract for employment in -the industry, the
court held that the union's discriminatory action violated the contract rights provision of § 1981.
15. Id. at 442. The court pointed out that state action was present in Dobbins, so that their
extension of the Jones doctrine was unnecessary. The Dobbins court may well have been
unconscious of its "extension" of Jones; the court seemed to think that the Jones decision itself
struck down the state action requirement of § 1981 because § I of the 1866 Act, relied upon
heavily by the Supreme Court, included both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982.
16. Like §§ 1981 and 1982, § 1985(3) does not on its face require state action. Note 5
supra.
17. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
18. See, e.g., Wallach v. Cannon, 357 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1966); Haldane v. Chagnon, 345
F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959); Van Daele v. Vinci,
294 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Iil. 1968); Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. I11. 1967); Bryant v.
Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 681 (W.D. Tenn. 1965); Swift v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 205 F. Supp. 563
(M.D. Ga. 1962).
19. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1964)), entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." The legislative history of the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871 is given a detailed analysis in Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some
Reflected Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, II ST. Louis U.L.J. 331 (1967).
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requirement. 20 A recent Fifth Circuit decision, 21 citing the thirteenth

amendment background of section 1982, held that Jones was not
authoritative as to the 1871 Act, and therefore would not alter the
decisional limits of section 1985 (3).2
Section 1 of the 1871 Act 2 l provided redress for deprivation ol
rights "under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage of any State"; 21 that requirement remains in the present
section 1983.2 5 The original interpretation of the predecessor of section
1983 was that only action authorized under state law fell within the

purview of that statute.26 The Supreme Court first rejected that
interpretation in United States v. Classic.2 7 Although a criminal
20. 341 U.S. 651 (1951). Some argue that, even though it was enacted pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment, § 1985(3) should not be held to require state action. This analysis notes
that § I of the Ku Klux Klan Ac twas expressly limited to state action, and concludes that had
Congress intended § 2 of that Act to be so limited, it would have included the state action
requirement in the language of § 2. See, e.g., Note, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for the
Protectionof FederalRights, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 839, 841 (1964).
21. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817 (5th Cir: 1969), noted in 23 VAND. L. REV. 158
(1969).
22. The Fifth Circuit also distinguished United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966),
involving a criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 241, which reads as follows:
"If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in
the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with
intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so securedThey shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
While 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) have been called criminal and civil counterparts
(Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780, 790 (5th Cir. 1958)), the precise criminal companion
of § 1985(3) was declared unconstitutional in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
In Guest, the majority opinion found state action alleged, and therefore failed to reach the
issue of whether a private conspiracy came within the prohibition of § 241. Six Justices, however,
in 2 concurring opinions, stated that they believed § 241 did extend to private conspiracies. The
Griffin court held firmly to the majority opinion's finding of state action, and determined that
the concurring opinions in Guest were insufficient to remove the state action requirement.
23. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964)).
24. The only case to discuss deprivations involving a source of state law other than those
quoted was Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). The case involved deprivation of voting rights
under the Alabama constitution. A lower federal court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.
Desirous of showing grounds for dismissal other than a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
(inability to provide adequate relief), the Court said: "We assume further, for the purposes of
decision, that [§ 1983] extends to a deprivation of rights under color of a state constitution
....
" Id. at 485 (emphasis added). The Court went on to acknowledge the dubious validity of
such an assumption. Id. at 485, 487.
25. The phrases "state action" and "under color of" state law have been interpreted as
stating essentially the same requirements. For a discussion of the comparative scopes of the 2
phrases, see Note, supra note 20, at 843-46.'
26. E.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927);
Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
27. 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Most commentators consider the Screws test an expansion of the
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prosecution, the decision required interpretation of the phrase "under
color of" law. 28 The Court held that "[m]isuse of power, possessed by
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of'
state law." 29 The Court's major step in extending the "color of law"
doctrine toward its present status was in Screws v. United States,30 in
which it declared that under "color" of law clearly meant under

"pretense" of law.31 In the landmark case of Monroe v. Pape,2 the
Court injected the Screws and Classic interpretations into section
1983,1 allowing a civil action under that section against police officers
who had made the plaintiff the victim of a grossly illegal -search and
34
detention.

In the instant case the court held that defendants had entered
plaintiffs' church purportedly pursuant to defendants'

state

constitutional rights to freedom of worship and peaceful assembly; and
that once inside, defendants exceeded any constitutional grant under

which they purported to act, thereby depriving plaintiffs of their rights
to freedom of assembly, speech, and worship, to hold, use, and enjoy
property, and to have their property protected. Therefore, in entering

the church, defendants acted "under color of state constitutional
right. ' 35 Alternatively, the court reasoned that the "color of law"
requirement of section 1983 was satisfied by the fact that defendants
entered plaintiffs' church under "color of" the "custom" of the State
Classic doctrine. See. e.g., Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers
Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277, 284-87 (1965).
28. The prosecution was under 18 U.S.C. § 242: "Whoever, under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory,
or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on
account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed
for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 242 bears the same relation to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as does 18
U.S.C. § 241 to42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See note 19supra.
29. 313 U.S. at 326.
30. 325 U.S. at 95.
31. Id. at I11.
32. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
33. The holding was phrased in terms of Classic. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
The Court noted with approval the Screws decision, apparently accepting the Screws and Classic
tests as equivalents.
34. The Monroe decision was also significant in that it laid to rest the question of what
rights are protected under § 1983, an issue not presented in the instant case. This facet of Monroe
is discussed in Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1486 (1969).
35. 303 F. Supp. at 1245.
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of Missouri to assemble and worship peacefully, 3 and concluded that
plaintiffs were entitled to relief under section 1983.3 The court also
noted that plaintiffs were entitled to redress under sections 1981, 1982,
and 1985(3), and held that, since Jones erased the state action
requirement under section 1982, an allegation of state action was not
essential for relief under section 1981 or section 1985(3).3 In allowing
a cause of action under section 1982, the court adopted a liberal
construction of that section and concluded that defendants had
infringed upon plaintiffs' right to "hold" property. Although the court
used the word "hold" in each reference to a violation of section 1982,
it adhered to the theory that section 1982 protects all property
rights-not merely those rights enumerated in the statute." The court
refused to narrow the scope of section 1981 and held that a white
person, as well as a non-white, might properly seek redress under that
section. 0 In allowing plaintiffs' claim under section 1985(3), the court
indicated that the use of semi-military uniforms, walkie-talkie
equipment, and pre-printed material clearly showed the requisite
41
conspiracy.
The court's analysis of the rights protected by sections 1981 and
1982 closely parallels the Supreme Court's attitudes toward liberal
construction of civil rights statutes;4 2 the Jones obliteration of the state
action requirement under section 1982, as here extended to actions
under section 198 1, 43 properly completes the transformation of the 1866
Civil Rights Act. The holding under section 1985(3) suffers more from
the illegitimacy of its justifications than from the result reached.
Although the holding contravenes the great weight of authority,4 4 it is
defensible in light of the concurrent enactment of sections 1983 and
1985(3).15 Had the court based its decision on the intent of the
Reconstruction Congress to reach private conspiracies under section
1985(3), as evidenced by the inclusion of the "color of law"
36. Note that the language of § 1983 includes action taken "under color of any . . .
. . of any State ..
"See no. 4 supra.
37. 303 F. Supp. at 1245.
38. Id. at 1244.
39. This is the view of some commentators. Cf Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayor Co.:
Judicial Activism Run Riot, 22 VAND. L. REv. 485, 496 (1969).
40. 303 F. Supp. at 1244.
41. Id. at 1247.
42. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
43. 303 F. Supp. at 1244.
44. See cases cited note 18 supra.
45. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, §§ 1, 2, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985(3) (1964)). See note 20 supra.
custom.

1970]

RECENT CASES

requirement in section 1983 and the absence of such language in section
1985(3),"' the case might have laid groundwork for the eventual demise
of the state action requirement under section 1985(3). With regard to
the application of the Jones analysis to section 1985(3), however,
Griffin v. Breckenridge,47 in which the Fifth Circuit rejected that
argument, is the better-reasoned case and should survive the instant
decision.
The activist attitude adopted by the court in its consideration of
the section 1985 (3) issue hardly waned as the court decided the question
of applicability of section 1983. Authority is unlimited for the
proposition that private invasion of civil liberties is without the
prohibition of section 1983;18 yet this decision in effect creates a cause
of action under that section for practically any private discrimination
or deprivation of rights. The initial fallacy of the ruling on section 1983
lies in the authority cited. Giles v. Harris"'does not support the court's
holding that action "under color of state constitutional right" satisfies
the "color of law" requirement; that supposition was made in Giles
solely "for the purposes of decision," to allow the Court to reach the
issue upon which plaintiff's claim was finally dismissed."' Even if the
instant case's interpretation of Giles is correct, a strained analysis is
necessary to maintain that defendants acted "under color of" the
Missouri constitution, which expressly excludes from its protection
action such5 as taken by defendants here; 5' or under "color of" a state
"custom. 2 The court seems to have overstepped the bounds of
reasonableness in so holding. Defendants entered the church wifh the
notorious design of causing disruption; there was no "pretense" of the
exercise of religious freedoms. Had entry been made under the guise
of peaceful religious exercise, it could be said that there was "power"
to enter, possessed by virtue of the state constitution, and that
subsequent "misuse of power" had been made possible only because
46. See Note, supra note 20, at 841.
47. 410 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969).
48. E.g., Wallach v. Cannon, 357 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1966); Weyandt v. Mason's Stores,
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Harrison v. Murphy, 205 F. Supp. 449 (D. Del. 1962).
49. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
50. See note 24"supra. In Giles, the provisions of the Alabama constitution itself violated
plaintiffs' rights. This facet of Giles, as well as its antiquity, makes noteworthy the Court's
statement that its consideration of the case "strikingly reinforces . . . the suggestion that state
constitutions were not left unmentioned in [§ 1983] by accident." 189 U.S. at 487.
51. The section on religious freedom in the Missouri constitution contains the following
limitation: "[B]ut this section shall not be construed to excuse acts of licentiousness, nor to justify
practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of the state, or with the rights of
others." Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
52. See note 4 supra.
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the wrongdoers were "clothed with the authority of" the state
constitution; but under the facts of the instant case, neither the Classic

criterion nor the Screws test can be reasonably applied so 3as to bring
defendants' activities within the "color of law" requirement.

Conflict of Laws- "Contacts" Approach Rejected-Lex Loci
Delicti Applied Until Undeniably Better Rule is Found
Guest passengers brought suit in Michigan courts for wrongful
death and personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident in

Ontario, Canada.' Plaintiffs were domiciliaries of New York where the
guest-host relationship was created; defendants, driver and owner, were
domiciliaries of Michigan where the car was licensed, leased, and
insu.red.2 Plaintiffs sought relief under the law of either New York3 or
Michigan, 4 both of which allow recoveries by automobile guests.
Defendants moved for summary judgment urging that under the local
law of the place of the tort, the plaintiffs were barred from recovery.

The Circuit Court of Wayne County granted defendants' motion and
the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed.' On appeal to the Michigan
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The law of the place of the tort will
be applied in conflict of laws cases unless some undeniably better rule
is available for its supercession. Abendschien v. Farrell,382 Mich. 510,
170 N.W.2d 137 (1969).
Traditionally, the local law of the place of the tort, lex loci delicti,
53. See notes 23-32 supra and accompanying text. The preliminary injunction was properly
granted in the instant case; §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985(3), each in its own right, provided sufficient
basis for the remedy sought. However, the decision should have been restricted to allowance of
relief under these sections; the court unnecessarily expanded § 1983 far beyond its intended scope.
1. The accident occurred while the parties were in route from Buffalo, New York, to
Detroit, Michigan. Plaintiffs based their cause of action on defendant's gross negligence, charging
that defendant drove the car at a high rate of speed while intoxicated.
2. Defendant Robert Farrell was the driver; defendant Dietrich Leasing, Inc., incorporated
under Michigan laws, was the owner and lessor of the automobile.
3. N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 388 (McKinney 1960).
4. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2101 (1960).
5. ONTARIO REV. STAT. ch. 172, § 105(2) (1960), denies recovery to gratuitous passengers
injured due to the negligence or gross negligence of the host driver. This section was amended
effective January 1, 1967, to allow recovery if the host driver is guilty of gross negligence.
ONTARIO REV. STAT. ch. 64, § 20(2) (1966).
6. Abendschien v. Farrell, II Mich. App. 662, 162 N.W.2d 165 (1968). The court found
that the place of the tort rule was no longer an acceptable choic.-of-law doctrine; however, the
court refused to adopt another rule on the theory that stare decisis required continued application
of the outdated rule until the Michigan Supreme Court repudiated it.
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has determined the substantive rights of parties in tort actions unless
the application of that law violates a strong public policy of the forum.7
This rule, based on the vested rights doctrine,8 provides certainty,
predictability, and simplicity while discouraging forum shopping;
however, its strict application may produce inequitable results. To ease
these inequities, courts have sought methods for circumventing the rule.
Some courts have labeled as procedural issues normally considered to
be substantive.' This technique avoids the lex loci delicti rule and allows
the court to apply the law of the forum. Other courts have avoided
undesirable results by holding the rule inapplicable to the case before

the court."0 Neither of these two methods for circumventing the rule
involves a complete repudiation of the rule's validity as a choice-of-law
technique. The American Law Institute, however, completely

abandoned the rule in the 1963 draft of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws and adopted instead the "significant contacts"

approach to choice-of-law problems." This approach requires the
application of the law of the state having the most significant
relationship to the issue involved. To determine where the most

significant relationship is located, four important contacts are to be
weighed and considered: the place of the injury; the place where the

conduct occurred; the domicile, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties; and the place where the relationship is

centered.'

The New York Court of Appeals followed the

Restatement's lead and abandoned the lex loci delicti rule in Babcock

v. Jackson.3 While that court spoke in terms of "dominant contacts,"
it concluded that the law of the jurisdiction most interested in the
problem involved and most intimately concerned with the outcome of
7.

RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§ 379, 384, 391, 612 (1934).

8. Under this doctrine, rights and obligations vest in the parties under the laws of the
jurisdiction where the tort occurred and follow the parties to any other jurisdiction. Id. § 384.
This theory has been criticized as failing to recognize equitable considerations in determining
rights and liabilities. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV.
173, 178 (1933); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58
HARV. L. REV. 361, 379-85 (1945).
9. E.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
10. E.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Haumschild v. Continental
Gas Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130,95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
II. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
12. Id. § 379(2).
13. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). The "dominant contacts"
approach had previously been adopted in contracts cases. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124
N.E.2d 99 (1954); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332b (Tent. Draft No.
5, 1959).
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the case should control.t4 Since Babcock, courts 5 and commentators"
have repudiated the traditional rule in favor of other approaches,
including those proposed by the Restaiement and the Babcock decision.
The results of this shift away from the traditional rule have been
confusion and inconsistency. Much of this confusion has resulted from
the failure of courts to distinguish between the "contacts" approach,
which relates to the number and weight of the contacts an event has
with the jurisdictions involved, and the "interests" approach, which
concerns the effects an event has on the jurisdiction. The inconsistency
of application is typified by the New York Court of Appeals' attempt
to apply the Babcock rationale to subsequent cases. For example, in
Dym v. Gordon,1 7 the court reached a result opposite from that in
Babcock although the facts were strikingly similar. In the Dyni case,
the court resorted to the mere counting of contacts rather than the
interest analysis required by Babcock. Thus, even the court which
created the "interest" approach has experienced difficulty in
maintaining a clear and consistent line of decisions. Despite the trend
in choice-of-law selection, Michigan has continued to apply the
8
traditional rule.'
The instant court began with the proposition that unless some
undeniably better rule was presented to supersede lex loci delicti, stare
decisis required its continued application. After observing that there
were significant contacts in both New York and Michigan, the court
balanced the advantages and disadvantages of the lex loci delicti rule
and the "significant contacts" approach. The court found that the
former provided the advantages of certainty and predictability of result
and ease of application, but sometimes produced unsatisfactory or
inequitable results. On the other hand, the latter approach allows the
equities of the parties and the policies of the concerned states to be
weighed and considered, but demands judicial sophistication and
precision in its application. Therefore, it fails to provide certainty. The
court next considered cases which exemplify the difficulty and
confusion caused by attempted applications of the "dominant
14.

12 N.Y.2d at 481-82, 191 N.E.2d at 283-84, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49.

15.

Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Wilcox v.

Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 13 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
16. E.g., Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. RIEV.
267 (1966).
17. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); see Conflict of Spirit:
Babcock v. Dynt, 22 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 119 (1967).
1
18. E.g., Griggs v. Griggs, 374 Mich. 268, 132 N.W.2d 163 (1965); Kaiser v. North, 292
Mich. 49, 289 N.W. 325 (1939).

1970]

RECENT CASES

contacts" rule.19 After considering these factors, the relative advantages
and disadvantages of the two rules and the problems attendant to the
application of the contacts approach, the court adopted the conclusion
of the dissenting opinion in Babcock that "there is no overriding

consideration of public policy which justifies or directs this change in
the established rule or renders necessary or advisable the confusion

which such a change will introduce.

20

Presented with a three-state conflict of laws problem, the

Michigan Supreme Court had several choice-of-law approaches from
which to choose. The court could have selected the "contacts"
approach of the Restatement2 l or the "interests" approach of

Babcock.2 Applying either of these rules, it is clear that New York or
Michigan law must be applied, since Ontario's interest in the issue of

liability is questionable and its only substantial contact was the
accident itself.' While it is true that a balance could result from the

application of either of these approaches, the balance would have been
between New York and Michigan. Ontario law would not have been

applied. Likewise, the court could have selected a choice-of-law
methodology such as that developed by Professors Cheatham and
Reese24 or the condensed version of that methodology advocated by

Professor Leflar.2 5 Leflar condenses the Cheatham-Reese scheme into
five factors: the need for predictability of result; the need to maintain
19. Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), affd, 26 App. Div. 2d
595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966); Casey v. Manson Const. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d

898 (1967).
20. 12 N.Y.2d at 487, 191 N.E.2d at 287, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 754 (dissenting opinion).
21. See note I I supra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 12 & 13 supra and accompanying text. The most satisfactory application of
the "interests" approach was made by the California Supreme Court in Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.
2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). In that case, the court indicated that all foreign
and domestic elements should be considered. Then, the choice-of-law should be made in such a
way as to reflect the policies of the jurisdiction with legitimate concerns.
23. See Trautman, A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 465 (1967). Professor Trautman found
that the probable purposes of the Ontario statute were the prevention of collusive suits and the
protection of the host-driver from suits by ungrateful guests. Such purposes do not suggest a
significant interest in the issue of liability in a suit between New York and Michigan domiciliaries
in Michigan courts. Id. at 770-72.
24. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLtJM. L. REv. 949 (1952). This
article suggests nine factors to be considered in making a choice-of-law. In order of relative
weight, these factors are: the need for interstate systems; the application of local law, unless there
is a good reason not to do so; the purposes of the local laws; the need for certainty, predictability,
and uniformity of result; the dominant interests of the states involved; the ease and convenience
of application; the implementation of local policy; the attainment of a just result.
25. Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267

(1966)-
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interstate and international order; the need for simplicity of
application; the advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
and the need to apply the better rule of law. This approach has been
implemented in at least one case, 6 and a variation on the approach has
been employed by Wisconsin courts on numerous occasions.27 The
Wisconsin variation is a useful one in situations where the application
of the "interests" or "contacts" approach has resulted in a balance.
When this occurs, Wisconsin courts have decided to apply the "better
rule" of law in accord with Leflar's fifth factor.28 Other suggested
solutions to the balanced situation are the application of the law of the
forum29 or the law of the place of the tort.30 The former suggestion is
reasonable in the two-state conflict because the forum will have the
same interests and contacts as the non-forum state; however, in the
three-state conflict, an unsatisfactory result may occur if the balance
is of questionable validity. In essence, the court rejects the law of the
of the forum is the place of the tort and all other interests and contacts
are balanced between the other two states, the application of the law
of the forum produces an illogical and unacceptable decision. But the
suggestion that lex loci delicti be employed when a balance occurs is
implicit in the instant case 3 The court finds contacts in both Michigan
and New York and then applies the law of Ontario. Such an approach
is of questionable validity. In essence, the courrt rejects the law of the
only two states with a legitimate interest in the issue of liability in favor
of the law of a state with little or no interest in the issue and only
minimal contacts with the event. Thus, the decision of the Michigan
Supreme Court typifies the inequitable, illogical decisions which
prompted the repudiation of the traditional rule in other jurisdictions
and demonstrates the willingness of a court to maintain an outmoded
rule simply because new approaches require precision and
sophistication of analysis.
26. Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
27. E.g., Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968); Zelinger v. State
Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578,
151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
28. The Wisconsin courts consider Leflar's first four factors and if this results in a balance
of interests, the better rule of law is applied. See note 27 supra.
29. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,
63 COLJ M. L. REV. 1233, 124243 (1963).
30. Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 185 (Mo. 1969).
31. Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137, 139 (1969).
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Conflict of Laws-Criminal Procedure-Law of Forum Applies
to Search and Seizure in Accused's Out-of-State Residence
Appellant, a resident of Oklahoma, was accused of burglarizing a
private home in Texas with the intent to commit rape. While appellant
was in legal custody, his wife agreed to allow police officers to conduct
a search of their residence without a search warrant. As a result of
this search, physical evidence2 was obtained which subsequently proved
instrumental in appellant's conviction before a Dallas County criminal
court. In appealing his conviction, appellant contended that the trial

court had erred in failing to apply Oklahoma law as to the legality of
the search of his home without a warrant or his personal consent

Since the law of Oklahoma provides each spouse with an independent4
personal right to demand a search warrant prior to a residence search,
appellant maintained that the crucial incriminating evidence had been
unlawfully seized in his home and improperly admitted at the trial. The
State responded that any question regarding an evidentiary matter was

of a procedural nature and hence governed by Texas law, under which
the critical evidence had been legally obtained pursuant to the wife's

consents The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, held, conviction
affirmed. The determination of a wife's authority to consent to a
residential search and seizure on behalf of her husband is a procedural
issue, governed by the law of the forum, even though the search
occurred in another jurisdiction. Burge v. State, 443 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1969).
1. Both Texas and Oklahoma police officers participated in the search. Burge v. State, 443
S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
2. The officers procured a sweater belonging to the appellant from which there was a piece
of material missing. A laboratory technician determined through microscopic examination that a
piece of cloth found at the scene of the crime fitted the hole and matched the material in the
sweater. The prosecutrix testified that during the course of her struggle with her assailant, she
had been able to "bite him and spit out a piece of the sweater he was wearing." Id. at 721-22.
3. Actually the appellant was insisting that the issue should be treated not as a matter of
conflict of laws, but rather as a question of constitutional law. The appellant argued that
Oklahoma law should apply because the Texas position was constitutionally suspect in light of
recent Supreme Court decisions in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). The appellant apparently did not challenge the State's contentions
as to which law should apply under conflict of laws principles. Id. at 723.
4. Simmons v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 18, 20, 229 P.2d 615, 618 (1951): "[T]he right to
demand a search warrant is a personal right given to husband and wife alike under the
Constitution which cannot be waived by either in absence of the other." See also Carignano v.
State, 31 Okla. Crim. 228, 238 P. 507 (1925).
5. It is well established in Texas that a wife may consent to a search and seizure on her
husband's premises where the consent is given without coercion. Joslin v. State, 165 Tex. Crim.
161, 305 S.W.2d 351 (1957); Padilla v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 618, 273 S.W.2d 889 (1954).
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The judicial confrontation of conflicting state views of the scope
of fourth amendment rights6 represents a novel situation in the conflict
of laws arena. Traditional conflict principles prescribe that issues of a
clearly procedural nature are governed by the internal laws of the
forum, whereas substantive matters are controlled by the laws of the
state in which the event or transaction occurred.7 For the purposes of
this rule, questions relating solely to the admissibility of evidence have
generally been treated as procedural.' It is well established, however,
that arbitrary application of the substance-procedure dichotomy is
unwarranted in situations presenting issues not clearly definable as
either substantive or procedural.' Furthermore, the permissible scope
of procedural characterization is limited to matters which genuinely
relate to the manner in which judicial business of the forum is
conducted.1 0 The traditional view was abandoned by the New York
Court of Appeals in Babcock v. Jackson," which enunciated the socalled "grouping of contacts" choice of law test, providing for
application of the substantive law of the state having the most
significant interest. The mechanics for applying the Babcock test were
succinctly articulated in the subsequent case of Dym v. Gordon."
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The fourth
amendment was made applicable to the states by the Supreme Court's decision in Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
7. California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227 (1958); Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass.
600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919). See Cook, "Substance" and "'Procedure"in Conflict of Laws, 42
YALE

L.J. 333 (1933).

8. Forney v. Morrison, 144 W. Va. 722, 110 S.E.2d 840 (1959); Lynde v. Western & S.
Life Ins. Co., 293 S.W.2d 147 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
oF LAWS § 138 (P.O. Draft 1967). See generally Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or
ProceduraP.10 VAND. L. REv. 467 (1957).
9. See. e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); H. GOODRICII,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80, at 143 (4th ed. Scoles 1964): "Ir]he distinctions made ought not to
be mechanical and fixed for the areas identified by this dichotomy are not at all clear but rather
vary and overlap." See also R. LEFLAR. AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 108, at 250 (1968): "The
procedure-substance dichotomy has real justification, but it ought not to be used as a cover-up
'gimmick' affording technical legal support for results justifiable only by other real reasons."
10. Leflar, Constitutional Lintits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMIt. PROn. 706,
720 (1963). Professor Leflar points out that this limitation on procedural characterization is
qualified only by a few special rules such as the statute of limitations, statute of frauds, and
measure of damages. See, e.g., Willitt v. Purvis, 276 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1960). indicating that,
on occasion, a rule phrased in terms of admissibility of evidence may be substantive. See also
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936), and Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U.S. 397 (1930). suggesting that procedural characterization can be carried to extremes.
II. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 191 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1963).
12. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
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Essentially the application process consists of three steps: first, the
isolation of the issue; second, the identification of the policies embraced
in the conflicting laws; and finally, the examination of the contacts of
the respective staites to ascertain which has a superior connection With
13
the occurrence and, thus, a superior interest in having its law applied.
Though the initial impact of Babcock was most profound in tortsconflicts cases,' 4 the "grouping of contacts" test has since received
widespread judicial application and substantial scholarly approval, 5
with its principle being broadly extended into various branches of the
conflicts field.
In the instant case, the court initially observed that there is a split
of authority in the United States as to the power of a wife to consent
to a residence search on her husband's behalf. Although Oklahoma,
like many other state and federal jurisdictions,' 7 had consistently
refused to recognize such interspousal authority, the court nevertheless
felt disinclined to overturn the long established Texas view to the
contrary. 8 In determining whether to apply the Oklahoma or Texas
law, the court reasoned that the question of the effect of a spouse's
consent was of an evidentiary nature and, hence, a matter of procedure.
Therefore, through application of the traditional substance-procedure
choice of law rule.," the court held that the law of Texas, lex fori,
controlled.
The instant decision clearly demonstrates the gross inequity
inherent in a mechanical application of the substance-procedure choice
of law rule. While the use of the procedural characterization is
invariably conducive to judicial convenience, its arbitrary application
13. Id. at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
14. Babcock repudiated the archaic rule that the law of the place of the injury governs all
stibstantive issues in torts cases. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
15. See Cavers, Cheatham, Leflar & Reese, Comments on Babcock v.Jackson, A Recent
Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1219, 1229, 1247, 1251 (1963).
16. The Babcock principle has been adopted with respect to contracts cases by the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332b (Tent.Draft No. 6, 1960), and tort cases,

id. § 379(i) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). It has been adopted with respect to commercial
transactions by the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105. See Cheatham, note 15 supra, at 1233,
indicating immediately after Babcock was decided that the Uniform Commercial Code "furnishes
strong support for the decision in Babcock v. Jackson and for the wide extension of its principle
in conflict of laws." See also Comment, The Aftermath of Babcock, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1301
(1966).
17. See note 34 infra.
18. The court was not persuaded by appellant's contention that the Texas view should be
declared unconstitutional; thus it treated the issue solely as one of conflicts of laws. 443 S.W.2d

at 723.
19. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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in the present context altogether ignores the dominant state interests
involved and vitiates the appellant's constitutional right of privacy as

implemented by his state of residency. 20 In effect, this decision is
founded upon an artificial after-the-fact classification, which is a

meaningless indicia as to which state's law should logically apply.
Under any choice of law approach, the forum's initial task should be
to clearly isolate the narrow issue over which the laws are in conflict.2 '

The instant court's failure to do so constitutes the fallacy which
apparently precipitated its erroneous characterization of the matter as
procedural. Implicit in the court's analysis is the fact that it viewed the
Texas-Oklahoma conflict as focused primarily upon the issue of
admissibility of evidence. If this had actually been the case, then under
general conflict principles22 the question would undoubtedly have been
one of procedure. In reality, however, the coliflict did not encompass

the matter of admissibility, but rather was directed soley toward the
more fundamental preliminary issue of whether the evidence had been

wrongfully obtained. The independent issues of wrongful seizure and
admissibilty should have been distinctly isolated by the court, for the
latter could only become relevant after the former had been

adjudicated. 23 If the court had correctly identified the conflict as
20. The Supreme Court in the landmark case of Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1930), which was followed by John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936),
warned that procedural characterization could go too far. Professor Leflar, in discussing these
decisions, explains: "It [procedural characterization] goes too far not because of any technical
rule of characterization, but for the same 'fair play and substantial justice' reasons that make it
unconstitutional when any court deprives any person of his life, liberty, or property by applying
a law which has so little of substantial connection with the issues in his case as to make the
application an unreasonable one." R. LEFLAR, supra note 9, § 63, at 142-43.
21. This is an absolute prerequisite to an accurate identification and evaluation of the
interests involved in any conflict of laws case.
22. According to the general rule, matters relating to the admissibility of evidence are
procedural and hence governed by the law of the forum. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
But see Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privilegesof Another Jurisdiction, 56
COLUM. L. REv. 535 (1956). Mr. Weinstein opens his article with the following statement
regarding privileged evidence: "The Restatement of Conflicts makes the flat
statement-supported by the standard works in the field-that 'the law of the forum determines
the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence.' It is submitted that this rule should not be
applied mechanically to evidence that may be excluded or admitted because it is or is not
privileged." Id.
23. That seizure and admissibility represent separate and distinct issues is indicated by the
fact that in Texas evidence wrongfully seized is not automatically inadmissible. In order for the
evidence in the present case to have been inadmissible, the appellant must have made timely
objection to the admissibility. 2 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 28.01 (Vernon 1966); see, e.g.,
Gutierrez v. State, 423 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Crim. 1968) (objections to a searbch are waived when
fruits of the search are introduced into evidence without objection). In addition, the appellant
must have framed his objection in such a manner as to give the judge sufficient information to
take judicial notice of the Oklahoma law. 1966 TEx. R. Civ. PROC. 184(a) (made applicable to
criminal cases by 4 TEX. CODE CRINI. PROC. art. 38.02 (Vernon 1966)).
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focused upon the question of wrongful seizure, then surely it could not
have justified an automatic application of the procedural label. For it

is clear that the wrongful seizure issue, divorced from all considerations
of admissibility' bore no substantial relationship to the manner in

which the judicial business of the"forum was conducted, and hence fell

24
outside the scope of permigsible procedural characterization.
Assuming that the court had properly isolated the issue, its second
step, consistent with Babcock guidelines, should have been to identify
the policies embraced in the conflicting state laws. 25 The Texas position
of allowing interspousal consent is predicated upon the policy that a
wife's rights of joint ownership, control, and possession of her residence
should necessarily empower her to authorize a search on her own
behalf, irrespective of commensurate rights of her husband. 2 The
emphasis is on the parties' relationship to the property rather than to
one another? On the other hand, the law of Oklahoma seeks primarily
to establish that the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures will not be "left to depend upon the unfettered
discretion" of another.28 This overriding policy objective is founded
upon the preinise that the fourth amendment right to privacy is
personal and, therefore, may only be personally waived. 2 It is
significant to note .that this position is consistent with contemporary
Supreme Court philosophy as reflected in recent decisions upholding
the integrity of personal constitutional rights through recognition of
their individualistic nature.30 A second pervasive policy objective

24. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 12 & 13 supra and accompanying text.
26. May v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 2, 83 S.W.2d 338 (1935). The fact that Texas is a
community property state was material in its adoption of the joint control rationale. Cass v.
State, 124 Tex. Crim. 208, 61 S.W.2d 500 (1933); 51 CORNELL L.Q. 795, 797-98 (1966). For
incisive criticism of the Texas policy of allowing interspousal consent, see Mascolo, Inter-spousal
Consent to Unreasonable Searches and Seizzures: A Constitutional Approach, 40 CONN. B.J. 35 1,
381-90 (1966).
27. Other jurisdictions rely on the parties' relationship to one another in allowing a wife's
consent to bind her husband. For instance, California courts reason that the marital relationship
should give a wife at least apparent authority to give binding consent to a search. In re Lessard,
62 Cal. 2d 497, 399 P.2d 39, 42 Cal. Rptr. 583 (t965); People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312
P.2d 665 (1957).
28. Mascolo, supra note 26, at 374, citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964).
29. Comment, The Effect of a Wife's Consent to a Search and Seizure of the Husband's
Property, 69 DICK L. REV. 69, 73 (1964).
30. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
In addition, the Supreme Court has recently emphasized that the fourth amendment protects a
right of privacy of the individual and not of property alone. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364
(1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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underlying the Oklahoma law is the prevention of interspousal

incrimination and a corresponding maintenance of public confidence in
the marital relationship. 31 An additional policy of somewhat less
magnitude which permeates the Oklahoma view is the desire to prevent

an unjustifiable dilution of the burden of proof in criminal
prosecutionsY2
Having defined the narrow focus of the conflict and delineated the
fundamental policies underlying the competing laws, the court should

have finally turned to an examination of the respective state contacts
to ascertain which had a superior connection with the occurrence and,
hence, a superior interest in having its law applied3 3 In this regard,
there are at least four significant factors that seem to indicate that the
nexus of interest lay in Oklahoma. First, the fact that the search and
seizure was conducted within an Oklahoma residence is obviously of
paramount importance. It is only logical that the interest sought to be
pyotected by either state's policy as to the scope of lawful seizures was
an interest existing at the time and place the seizure was made.

Secondly, the fact that the appellant may reasonably have expected that
measure of constitutional protection afforded by the laws of his home
state, militates against allowing a minority3' Texas view to abrogate his

anticipated privacy rights.35 A third factor, closely interrelated with the
first two, is the fact that the parties most directly involved with the

search and seizure were domiciliaries of Oklahoma. Finally, the interest
in uniformity of privacy rights allotted the residents of each state, as
well as the need for uniform

restrictions on intrastate police

investigations, would be better served by application of Oklahoma
law.36 Balanced against these Oklahoma contacts is a substantial Texas
31.

For a perceptive discussion of this policy objective, see Mascolo, supra note 26, at 374-

75.
32. Id. at 372-73.
33. See notes 12 & 13 supra and accompanying text. It is significant to note that the
Babcock weighing of contracts approach is extremely flexible in the sense that its key phrase,
"most significant contacts," lacks a precisely defined content and so leaves room for considerable
judicial discretion. The test can easily comprehend a weighing of social policies and governmental
interests which are discoverable from the contacts themselves. R. LEFLAR. supra note 9, § 96, at
222. Of course, the interests that merit consideration in the balancing process vary according to
the peculiar facts of each case. However, a concise and seemingly all-inclusive list of pertinent
considerations has been formulated by Professor Leflar. Id. § 105, at 245.
34. See Mascolo. supra note 26, at 369, indicating that the Texas position represents a
distinct minority view.
35. The weight that should be accorded this factor in situations where a party did not think
in advance about choice of law is forthrightly discussed in Professor Leflar's treatise. R. LEFLAR.
supra note 9, § 106, at 245-47.
36. Presumably the laws governing interspousal consent are designed in part to furnish
directives to law officers in making pretrial investigations. Under the instant decision, the
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interest in achieving equally just results in criminal prosecutions of outof-state and Texas residents. It is not difficult to comprehend the
forum's reluctance to adopt a rule in prosecutions of non-residents that
might compel the exclusion of vital evidence which would be readily
admissible in comparable suits against Texans. This Texas interest,
however, should not be the controlling factor in choosing the applicable
law since it arose only as an indirect after effect of the allegedly
wrongful seizure. Logical analysis urges that the interest sought to be
protected at the time and place of the search and seizure should be
decisive. Therefore, it appears that not only has the instant court
adopted an improper choice of law approach, but in doing so, it has
reached the wrong result.

Constitutional Law-Criminal Defendant Has Absolute Right to
be Present at Trial
During his trial in state court for armed robbery, the defendant
insisted upon representing himself and thereafter engaged in a
continuous course of disruptive and disrespectful conduct.' The trial
judge repeatedly warned the defendant that he would be excluded from
the courtroom if he did not behave. After threats from the defendant
that "there's not going to be no trial" and that he intended to "keep
on talking all through the trial,"'2 the trial judge ordered the defendant
removed from the courtroom. Although the defendant was permitted
in the courtroom during the presentation of his defense, he was
excluded from the trial during the voir dire and did not return until
the conclusion of the prosecution's case. In the interim, the defendant
was brought into the courtroom on four occasions in order to be
identified by witnesses; on each occasion, he was immediately removed
after identification. In a consolidated appeal from his conviction and
the dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the defendant argued that
his forcible exclusion from the proceedings was a violation of his sixth
inhibitions on residence searches would depend upon the law of the place of the crime and would
thereby create great uncertainty as to police procedure in searches made in other jurisdictions.
I. During the voir dire. the defendant told the trial judge that "[w]hen I go out for
lunchtime, you're going to be a corpse here." Following this outburst, the defendant tore his
attorney's file and threw the papers on the floor, and was finally removed from the courtroom
until the jury was seated. When the defendant resumed his abusive comments during the
prosecution's opening statement, the trial judge ordered him removed once again. United States
exrel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 233-34 (7th Cir. 1969).
2. Id. at 234.
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amendment rights to be personally present and to confront the
witnesses against him. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed on the

basis that the defendant voluntarily chose to misbehave and thereby
elected to waive his sixth amendment rights. 3 On appeal from the

district court's dismissal of the defendant's habeas corpus petition,
held, reversed. A criminal defendant has an absolute right to be
personally present at all stages of the proceedings to confront the
witnesses against him, and the sixth amendment precludes the

relinquishment of that right through an election of choices proposed by
the trial judge. United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 955 (1969).

The early common law afforded the criminal defendant both the
right to be present at his trial' and the right to appear free from all

shackles and bonds or other forms of restraint. 5 The right to be
personally present at all stages of the proceedings has been expressly
preserved under the sixth amendment right to confront witnesses and
has been said to be as fundamental as the right to an impartial jury.'
Although the right to appear without physical restraint is less clearly
preserved under the United States Constitution, the rule has often been
justified on the constitutional grounds of due process and the right to
a fair and impartial trial.7 The common law exceptions to both these

important rights of the accused have been followed, however, even
where the right is founded upon a constitutional mandate. For instance,

the right to appear without physical restraint does not apply when there
is danger of escapes or when restraint is necessary for a safe and orderly
3. People v. Allen, 37 I11.2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 907 (1967).
4. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884);
Evans v. United States, 284 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1960); Echert v. United States, 188 F.2d 336 (8th
Cir. 1951); People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879, 186 P.2d 405 (1947); People v. Medcoff, 344 Mich.
108, 73 N.W.2d 537 (1955); State exrel. Shetsky v. Utecht, 228 Minn. 44, 36 N.W.2d 126 (1949).
5. See Blaine v. United States, 136 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo.
488, 174 P.2d 717 (1946); State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn. 384, 97 N.W.2d 472 (1959); Pierpont v.
State, 49 Ohio App. 77, 195 N.E. 264 (1934); Commonwealth v. Reid, 123 Pa. Super. 459, 187
A. 263 (1936).
This right has been recognized on the theory that the law requires that the accused have the
unrestrained use of his limbs and must not be compelled to suffer any physical bonds which might
confuse or embarrass him before the jury. Other courts base the rule on the fourteenth amendment
right to due process and a fair and impartial trial. Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir.
1951).
6. People v. Medcoff, 344 Mich. 108, 73 N.W.2d 537 (1955); cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97 (1934).
7. Cases cited note 5 supra.
8. Se Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951); State v. Brooks, 44 Hawaii 82,
352 P.2d 611 (1960); People v. Mendola, 2 N.Y.2d 270, 140 N.E.2d 353, 159 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Ct.
App. 1957).
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proceeding. 9 The decision to restrain the defendant is within the
discretion of the trial judge, and one of two tests usually prevails in
making the determination. Physical restraint of the criminal defendant
has been upheld where the record reflected some immediate necessity
for the use of such restraint, 10 or less frequently, where therefwas a
reasonable apprehension of danger under all the circumstances.1 The
right to be present has been less litigated, but it is clear that there are
some exceptions to the rule. 2 In Hopt v. Utah,'3 the United States
Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant in a capital case could
not waive his right to be present at trial and described the right as
unqualified. The Court has distinguished this case, however, on the
ground that it involved a capital offense with the defendant in custody
and has subsequently upheld "waivers" in non-capital cases. A
criminal defendant who is absent from part of the proceedings may
waive his right to be present when he is immediately furnished a
transcript of the those proceedings and fails to object to the testimony
or request further examination. 4 In Echert v. United States,5 the court
held that a federal criminal defendant charged with a felony other than
a capital offense may waive his objections to the impaneling of the jury
in his absence. There are only two cases, however, which deny the
criminal defendant the right to be present as a result of voluntary
misconduct on his part. Prior to the Hopt decision, the federal court
in United States v. Davis" sustained the trial judge's action in having
the defendant removed from the courtroom because of an unseemly
disturbance. In reaching its decision, the court stated that the defendant
could not "complain of the order which was made necessary by his
own misconduct, and which he could at any time have terminated by
signifying his willingness to avoid creating a disturbance.' 7 While a
waiver might be implied in Davis, the court was more explicit in People
9. See Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951); State v. Roberts, 86 N.J. Super.
159, 206 A.2d 200 (1965); State v. Daniels, 347 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. 1961); State v. Temple, 194
Mo. 237, 92 S.W. 869 (1906).
10. State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn. 384, 389, 97 N.W.2d 472, 476-77 (1959).
11. State v. Roberts, 86 N.J. Super. 159, 206 A.2d 200(1965).
12. Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926): "The right of confrontation did

not originate with the provision in the Sixth Amendment, but was a common-law right having
recognized exceptions. The purpose of that provision, this Court often has said, is to continue

and preserve that right, and not to broaden it or disturb the exceptions."
13.
14.
15.
16.

110 U.S. 574 (1884).
Parker v. United States, 184 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1950).
188 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1951).
25 F. Cas. 773 (No. 14923) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1869).

17.

Id. at 774.
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v. De Simone.' In that case, the defendant voluntarily left the
courtroom on several occasions and at one point was forcibly excluded
following his profane remarks to the witnesses and the trial judge. The
state appellate court held that under the Illinois constitution the
defendant's misconduct was an effective waiver of his right to be
present at the proceedings.
In the instant decision, the court recognized the general rule that
a criminal defendant has a right to be personally present and noted that
there may be circumstances where a defendant effects a waiver of his
right. The court disagreed, however, with the view that the defendant's
offensive conduct could donstitute such a waiver. Defining waiver,
whether express or implied, as a voluntary, intentional relinquishment
of a known right, the court concluded that the relinquishment of rights
compelled by an election of choices is involuntary and not a waiver at
all. The court interpreted the right to be present as "absolute," stating
that no conditions could be imposed on the right and that the
defendant's insistence upon exercising -his right under unreasonable
conditions did not amount to a waiver. Thus, exclusion of the
defendant from the courtroom, even upon conditions completely within
his control, violated his constitutional rights under the sixth
amendment. In a dissenting opinion, 9 Senior Circuit Judge Hastings
interpreted the constitutional mandate of the sixth amendment in a
different light. Rejecting the thesis that "an unconditional unqualified
right" in criminal cases flows from the sixth amendment, the dissent
determined that the sixth amendment provision that a criminal
defendant "shall enjoy the right" does not carry with it an unqualified
right to exercise it on his own terms. Consequently, Judge Hastings
agreed with the Supreme Court of Illinois in finding a waiver in
situations where the defendant by his own action brings about his
absence from the trial.
The dissent in the instant case proved to be accurate in forecasting
the result of the majority's decision in situations where multiple
defendants are determined to disrupt the trial to the point of no
return.20 The now famous conspiracy trial of the "Chicago Eight"
brought to life Judge Hasting's vision of "[s]hackles, chains, gags and
18.

9 I11.
2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956). The defendant's rights under the Federal

Constitution were not litigated, but speaking of the Illinois constitutional provision, the court
stated that "[t]he right to appear and defend is not given to a defendant to prevent his trial either

by voluntary absence, or by wrongfully obstructing its progress." Id. at 533, 138 N.E.2d at 562.
19. 413 F.2dat235.
20. Id. at 236.
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a courtroom full of deputy marshals." 2 Citing the present case as
authority, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois has recently upheld the gagging and handcuffing of "Black
Panther" leader Bobby Seale as the proper course of action.2 In doing
so, the court made a sweeping application of the instant decision,
stating that "[w]hile a defendant . . .has an absolute right to be
present . . . he does not have a right to brazenly make a shambles of
the criminal judicial process and attempt to force a mistrial .... "2
If this result is a proper application of Allen, then the instant decision
is a very dangerous precedent. Taken together, the Allen and Seale
cases seem arbitrarily to enforce a right-almost a duty-of the
defendant to be present, regardless of the physical restraints necessary
to accomodate his presence and an orderly proceeding. In reaching this
conclusion, both cases virtually ignore the existing exceptions to the
right to be present, the prejudicial effect of the defendant's appearance
bound and gagged, and the effect of such action on the defendant's
right to appear unrestrained.
Although the defendant may lose his right to appear unrestrained
through his own conduct, 24 it should be just as evident that the right
to be present may also be waived. If a criminal defendant can waive
his right to trial altogether, he should be able to waive his right to be
present. The apparent issue is what conduct by the defendant is
sufficient to constitute a waiver. Obviously, the word "waiver" is an
elastic term with many shades of meaning, and therefore it must be
interpreted under the circumstanceg of each case. For example, the
court in the instant decision found no waiver since it requires a
voluntary, intentional relinquishment. Nevertheless, had the court
chosen to do so, it could have gone a step further and implied a waiver
"... when one in possession of any right . . . does . . .something
the doing of which . . . is inconsistent with the right, or his intention
to rely upon it. ' ' 25 Interpreted in this light, Allen's abusive conduct
could be defined as voluntary, intentional, and inconsistent with his
known right. Consequently, the court might have found, just as
logically, that Allen had waived his right to be present.
This definitional discussion merely highlights the critical problem
which has gone unresolved under existing case law. There are many
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Seale v. Hoffman, 38 U.S.L.W. 2287 (N. D. III. Nov. 5, 1969).
Id.
See notes 8-9 supra & accompanying text.
BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 1751 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
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conflicting interests to be reconciled in the trial of a recalcitrant
defendant: the accused's right to hear the evidence and confront the
witnesses against him; his right to be free of physical restraint so as
not to appear already condemned to the jury; similar rights of codefendants; the court's and attorneys' duty to insure a solemn, orderly,
and fair trial;2 and, in a larger sense, society's interest in securing such
a fair and impartial proceeding for every accused. To respond to such
a problem by a narrow definition of "waiver" and strapping the
defendant into his chair at the expense of an impartial trial is
unrealistic and unprofessional. At some point, the recalcitrant
defendant's right to be present becomes unduly prejudicial and
inequitable to him, his co-defendants, the court, and society. One can
easily imagine the connotation of guilt that would accompany
handcuffing the accused into his chair. The prejudice might work to the
detriment of the State's interest as well; imagine the effect of strait
jacketing a defendant who is relying on the defense of insanity.
In spite of a feeling that no other remedy is available,2 there are
several alternatives to simply forcing the defendant to be present under
any and all circumstances.2 In many cases, a warning or a contempt
citation may suffice. Failing this, some form of restraint is possible,
perhaps, by posting deputies at the defendant's side. Nevertheless, when
the defendant's conduct makes it impossible to proceed unless he is
physically tied and gagged, the possibility of exclusion from the
courtroom must be made available. Fortunately, modern technology
makes it possible to exclude the defendant without completely causing
him to forefeit his right to hear the evidence against him. In extreme
cases, the accused could be removed to another room, but allowed to
see and hear the proceedings by closed circuit television or some other
similar facility. In addition, he could be provided with telephone or
intercom communication with his attorney in the courtroom if deemed
desirable by the trial judge. Such an innovation would preserve the
dignity and order of the proceedings, avoid the prejudicial effect of
restraining the defendant in the courtroom, and preserve the
defendant's right to see and hear the evidence against him. At the same
time, society's interest in seeing that the judicial system does justice in
26. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 36; ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs
Nos. 5 & 22.
27. Scale v. Hoffman, 38 U.S.L.W. 2287 (N.D. II1. Nov. 5, 1969).
28. For an excellent discussion of the case law development,.see Note, Violent Misconduct
In The Courtroom-PhysicalRestraint And Eviction Of The Criminal Defendant, 28 U. PIrr.
L. REv.443 (1967).
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spite of the defendant's conduct would be vindicated. The only interest
compromised would be that of the defendant personally to confront the
witnesses, but this is a result necessitated by his own misconduct.

Constitutional Law-Imports and Exports-State and Local
Tax-States May Tax Imports Held in Bonded Smelting and
Refining Warehouses
Plaintiff instituted a proceeding for a writ of mandate to cancel
the assessment and prevent the collection of ad valorem personal
property taxes on imported metals.' These metals were held by plaintiff
in a customs bonded warehouse and were appropriated to processing
for domestic consumption. Plaintiff's warehouse is designated a Class
7 Customs Bonded and Refining Warehouse and is operated for the
pirpose of extracting lead and other metals from ores and
concentrates. The customs duties on the imported metals, which are in
the custody and under the supervision of the United States Bureau of
Customs,3 are not immediately payable upon receipt of the ore by the
plaintiff.' Defendant, County of Contra Costa, which had levied the tax
on the imported metals, contended that by engaging in the local
business of smelting and refining plaintiff had become subject to local
taxation. The California Superior Coiurt rejected the defendant's
position, granted the writ of mandate, and enjoined collection of the
tax. The court held that such taxatiofi was proscribed by preemptive
federal regulation, the commerce clause, the supremacy clause, and the
import-export clause of the United States Constitution. On appeal to
the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, held, reversed.
Imports held in bonded smelting and refining warehouses lose their
immunity from local taxation once they are appropriated to processing
1. The property consisted of imported metal-bearing ores and concentrates, refined metals
subject to a United States Customs Bond, similar imported materials not subject to bond, and
domestic gold.
2. See Tariff Act of 1930 § 312, cl. 497, 46 Stat. 692, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1312

(1964).
3. 19 C.F.R. §§ 19.17-.25 (1969). A customs officer is permanently stationed at the
bonded warehouse and is responsible to certify an accurate accounting of the dutiable metals.
Plaintiff is also required to file monthly inventory reports with the Bureau of Customs.
4. Plaintiff is relieved of any obligation to pay duty on imported metals until and unless
they are shipped from the bonded warehouse to a domestic purchaser or until three years have
elapsed from the date of entry of such goods into the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1312 (1964).
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for domestic consumption.5 American Smelting & Refining Co. v.

County of Contra Costa, 77 Cal. Rptr. 570 (Ct. App. 1969), appeal
docketed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3240 (U.S. Dec. 30, 1969) (No. 656).

Invalidation of state and local taxation of imported goods has
traditionally been based upon either the import-export clause or the
commerce clause of the Constitution. Regarding the former, early fears

that the seaboard states would unfairly tax imports to the detriment
of the interior states6 resulted in the constitutional prohibition that
"[n]o State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws. . .. " This

clause grants to the federal government the exclusive power to tax
importation into the United States and prohibits state taxation of such
goods after their entry and for so long as they remain imports.8 The
fundamental test used to determine whether goods have lost their

character as imports for state and local tax purposes is whether "the
importer has so acted upon the thing imported, that it has become
incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the
country. . .. " Attempting to apply this standard, courts have

determined that imports for manufacture lose their constitutional
immunity from state taxation when they are subjected to the
manufacture for which they were imported,"0 when they are sold," when

the original packages are broken, 2 or when such goods are committed
to the supply of the manufacturer's "current operational needs."' 3
Although no court has precisely determined whether the mere presence
of goods in bonded warehouses renders the goods immune from state
taxation, Tres Ritos Ranch Co. v. Abbott 4 indicated by way of dicta
5. The court also concluded that gold, whether of foreign or domestic origin, was not
excempt from local taxation because of preemptive federal regulation.
6. See J. MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 543 (1966).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
8. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bbwers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959); Hooven & Allison
Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 657 (1945); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S.419, 441 (1827).
9. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 441 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.) (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., Hobven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 661 (1945); McGoldrick v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414, 423 (1940); Gulf Fisheries Co. v. Maclnerney, 276 U.S. 124, 126 (1928);
F. May& Co. v. New Orleans, 178 U.S.496, 501 (1900).
11. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 557 (1945).
12. F. May & Co. v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496, 509 (1900); Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. 29,
34 (1871).
13. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 543 (1959) (upholding property
taxes on imported materials that were held for use in the manufacturing process).
14. 44 N.M. 556, 105 P.2d 1070 (1940). Upholding a state levy, the court found that cattle
imported under bond were not stored in a bonded warehouse when allowed to graze on a 500,000
acre ranch and were not in their original package. Id.
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that "a state can impose taxes before the United States customs have

been paid whenever the imported article has been commingled with the
property of the state."15 According to this view, the placement of

commodities in a bonded warehouse is merely evidence indicating that
the goods are still imports; however, the evidence is not necessarily
conclusive.16 Similarly, Orr Felt & Blanket Co. v. Schneider 7 indicated
that although the imported goods remained in original packages in a
bonded warehouse, the determinative factor for the conclusion that they

were not taxable was that they were in a locked portion of the
warehouse, which was accessible only to the customs officer. 8

State and local taxation of imported goods has also been
invalidated under the commerce clause which confers on Congress the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states. 9 This power "is complete in itself, may be exercised to

its utmost extent and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution .... ,,20 Congress's exclusive and plenary
power may not be limited, qualified, or impeded by state action; 2' and

under the supremacy clause of the Constitution,2 2 any valid
congressional regulation of commerce2 must prevail over conflicting or
15. Id. at 563, 105 P.2d at 1074.
16. Id. at 561, 105 P.2d at 1073. The case of In re Miller Land & Livestock Co., 56 F.
Supp. 34 (D. Mont. 1944), treated the question of immunity from taxation as being completely
dependent upon whether the cattle were in a valid "bonded warehouse." Concluding that the
legislature had not intended that a ranch of 160,000 acres could be a warehouse, the court found
that the cattle could be taxed.
17. 3 Ohio St. 2d 14, 209 N.E.2d 150 (1965) (invalidating a state property tax).
18. In District of Columbia v. International Distrib. Corp., 331 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
the court found that goods stored in bonded warehouses did not become subject to the jurisdiction
of the state until withdrawn from the warehouse and removed from the control of the customs
official. In Republic Steel Corp. v. Porterfield, 14 Ohio St. 2d 101, 236 N.E.2d 661 (1968), the
majority invalidated a state tax upon imports stored in a customs bonded warehouse. The imports
remained in their original packages, but had not been appropriated to the purpose for which they
were imported. Concurring, Chief Justice Taft stated that "the bond in question is in the nature
of a surety bond to guarantee payment of customs duties and in no way limits or prohibits the
use of the manganese ore. . . ." Thus "appellant's inventory of imported manganese ore is not
immune from the Ohio personal property tax because it is held in bond.
... Id. at 664-65
(concurring opinion).
19. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes ....
20. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
21. See Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904); Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24 How.)
169 (1860); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 262 (1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824).
22. U.S. CONST. art VI.
23. Congress may validly regulate this area of foreign commerce through its power to
control any phase of commerce which has a "substantial economic effect" on interstate or foreign
commerce. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). (Courts have repeatedly recognized that
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inconsistent state action. 24 Pursuant to its power, Congress, as early as
1890,2 enacted legislation for the creation and maintenance of bonded
smelting and refining warehouses and vested in the Secretary of the
Treasury the authority "to make such rules and regulations as may be

necessary to carry out the provisions of this section. ' 2 Accordingly,
the Secretary enacted the Customs Regulations of 1923Y Article 85028
of these regulations provided that "[i]mported goods in bonded
warehouse are exempt from taxation under the general laws of the
several states."" In McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp.,0 the Court held

that since article 850 was in effect when Congress -adopted the Tariff
under the commerce clause, Congress has power to prohibit state taxation in areas where the
states would be free to tax under the Constitution in the absence of congressional action.
International Shoe Co. v. Cochram, 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d 314, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902
(1964); Smith Kline & French Lab. v. State Tax Comm'n, 241 Ore. 50, 403 P.2d 375 (1965);
State ex rel Ciba Pharmaceutical Prod., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964).
24. See, e.g., Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 613 (1926); Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 230 (1899). The same principle is applicable to state
and local tax laws which are determined to be in conflict with federal legislation. E.g., Carson V.
Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952); MeGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1940);
Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933).
25. McKinley Tariff Act of Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1244, § 24, 26 Stat. 617; Wilson Tariff Act
of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 21, 28 Stat. 551; Dingley Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 1I,§ 29,
30 Stat. 210 (applied only to imported goods intended for export); Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of
Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 24, 36 Stat. 89 (applied to goods intended for export as well as for
domestic consumption); Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § IV, subsection 1, 38 Stat. 198; Act of
Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, tit. III, § 312, 42 Stat. 940.
26. McKinley Tariff Act of Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1244, § 24, 26 Stat. 617. The Secretary was
granted the same authority by the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. 11,§ 312, 46 Stat. 692, as
amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1312 (1964).
27.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, CUSTOMs REGULATIONS 1923.

28. The original regulation appeared.in article 731 of the Customs Regulation of 1915. In
1943, the format of the Regulation was changed since the provisions prohibiting state taxation
and certain other state acts were consolidated and moved from the body of the text to a footnote.
Section 19.6 n.l 1, Customs Regulations of 1943, 8 Fed. Reg. 8398. The present regulation appears
in 19 C.F.R. § 19.6 n.ll (1969) which reads: "Imported goods in bonded warehouse are exempt
from taxation or judicial process of any State or subdivision thereof."
29. As a departmental construction of a statute, an administrative regulation is not binding
upon the courts and has only ordinary persuasive force. On the other hand, if it has been
continually in force for a long period of time and the statute is doubtful and ambiguous, the
regulation can be ignored for compelling reasons. See National Lead Co. v. United States, 252
U.S. 140 (1920); Komado & Co. v. United States, 215 U.S. 392 (1910); United States v. Healey,
160 U.S. 136 (1895). McCaughn v. Hersey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 492 (1931), held that a
long standing Treasury Department regulation which had been consistently enforced for a number
of years by officials charged with its administration may "not be judicially disturbed except for
reasons of weight." See Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931);
Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 (1930); Brester v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327,
336 (1930).
30. 309 U.S. 414 (1940). The Court held that the statutes and regulations taken together
amount to regulation of foreign commerce and prohibit state taxation of imported oil refined in
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Act of 1930, 31 it was "incorporated by reference" and, as such, was a
regulation of foreign commerce.3 2 When no direct conflict exists, the

state or local action may be invalidated if it obstructs the
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. The

state or local action may also be invalidated without a direct conflict
if Congress, through full and comprehensive legislation, has intended
to preempt the field. 33 Thus, a determination that Congress has
preempted an area and removed it from state or local control involves

a consideration of the entire scheme of congressional regulation and a
balancing of both the local and national interests.34 McGoldrick v. Gulf
Oil Corp.35 considered whether federal regulation had preempted state

taxation of the sale of imports which were intended for use in foreign
commerce and were refined after entry. The Court concluded that the

applicable statutes and regulations 3 indicated a congressional intent to

prohibit local taxation for the purpose of enabling American refiners
3
to meet foreign competitioi. 1

In the instant case, after disposing of preliminary matters, 38 the
a bonded warehouse and intended for use as ship's stores in foreign commerce. As to the
regulation prohibiting taxation of goods stored in bonded warehouses, supra note 28, the Court
stated: "The customs regulation prescribing the exemption from state taxation, when applied to
the facts of the present case, states only what is implicit in the Congressional regulation of
commerce presently involved." 309 U.S. at 429.
31. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1654 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1965-68).
32. 309 U.S.414,326 (1940).
33. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Huron
Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,443 (1960); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
34. See Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 24 (1964) (liquor under federal
jurisdiction may not be subjected to state regulation despite the powers reserved to the states under
the 2 ist amendment).
35. 309 U.S.414 (1940).
36. Many of the same regulations are involved in the instant case.
37. In addition to the Tariff Act of 1930 and article 942 of the Customs Regulations of
1931, the Court considered the legislative history of § 601 of the Revenue Act of 1932, ch.
209, § 601, 47 Stat. 169, and § 630, ch. 289, § 705(a), 52 Stat. 570, which taxed the
importation of crude petroleum and exempted fuel placed on vessels engaged in foreign commerce.
For other cases indicating a congressional intent to prohibit local taxation see Idlewild Liquor
Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329-34 (1964) (the commerce clause deprives the state of the power to
prevent transactions supervised by the Bureau of Customs involving intoxicants for delivery to
consumers in foreign markets); National Distillers Prods. Corp. v. City & County, 141 Cal. App.
2d 651, 657-58, 297 P.2d 61, 66 (1956) (liquor in interstate shipment on tax day which was to be
shipped in foreign commerce was immune from local taxation under the commerce clause since
the tax would interfere with federal regulation); During v. Valente, 267 App. Div. 383, 46
N.Y.S.2d 385 (1944) (New York's Alcoholic Beverage Control Law was inapplicable to goods
in Foreign Trade Zone created under the power of Congress to regulate commerce with the
nation).
38. The court held that those goods not subject to customs duties were not immune to state
and local taxation under the import-export clause because they were imported to supply the
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court examined section 312 of the Tariff Act of 1930 along with the
relevant Customs Regulations 9 and concluded that the government's
interest in the bonded ore was to insure that a sufficient quantity equal

to the amount of the bond was available at all times. Thus, a security
interest exists which should not affect the local government's right to
tax the bonded ore.40 The court further stated that congressional
regulation of foreign commerce was not intended to create an enclave
free from local taxation. Instead, Congress had only intended to free
the taxpayer from the obligation of paying the duty until the goods
were subsequently sold and consumed in domestic commerce. Squarely
facing the incorporation by reference of article 942 of the Customs
Regulations of 1931,41 which prohibited state taxation of bonded

imports, the court stated that McGoldrick limited this regulation to the
facts presented therein; therefore, the regulation is incorporated only in
so far as it prohibits the taxation of the sale of goods imported and
refined in bonded warehouses which are intended to be used as ship's
stores.42 Moreover, McGoldrick involved goods destined for foreign
commerce which are immune from taxation under the import-export
clause rather than goods intended for domestic consumption as in the

instant case. Interpreting McGoldrick in this light, the court concluded
that the regulation exempted only those imported goods which are

constitutionally exempt from state and local taxation while in a bonded
warehouse. 43 The court further stated that had Congress intended to
manufacturer's current operational needs. No violation of the commerce clause was found as the
nondutiable goods had left the stream of foreign and interstate commerce and had become subject
to the taxing power of the state. Moreover, the tax did not discriminate against interstate or
foreign commerce.
39. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 312, 46 Stat. 692, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1312
(1964); 19 C.F.R. §§ 19.(a)(7), 19.17-.25 (1969).
40. Significant to the court's conclusion were: 19 C.F.R. § 19.18(a) (1969) ("The full
dutiable contents of such metal-bearing materials, as ascertained by commercial assay made by
the Government chemists, less the wastage allowance . . . must be either exported, duty-paid, or
transferred to another bonded warehouse . . ... "); 19 C.F.R. § 19.1(a)(7) (1969) (the bonded
smelter and refinery may treat imported metal bearing materials for domestic consumption as
well as for exportation); 19 U.S.C. § 1312 (1964) (metal bearing materials of both foreign and
domestic origin may be processed); 19 C.F.R. § 19.17(f) (1969) (bonded metals arc required to
be kept separate and distinct from nonbonded material until sampled and weighed when they
become a part of the mass of material in the bonded warehouse); and 19 C.F.R. § 19.24(a) (1969)
(a bond may be transferred from goods at one bonded warehouse to goods in another, even though
the goods in the second were of domestic origin).
41. Article 850 of the Customs Regulations of 1923 was continued as article 942 of the
Customs Regulations of 1931.
42. The court cited McGoldrick for the proposition that article 942 "when applied to the
facts of the present case, states only what is implicit in the Congressional regulation of commerce
presently involved." 309 U.S. at 429 (emphasis added).
43. The court examined the authority cited in the Customs Regulation of 1915, article 731,
which later became Article 942 in the Customs Regulations of 1931, and noted that all cases cited
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give bonded smelters and refiners total immunity from local taxes, such
legislation would have been unconstitutional because the power of the
states to levy nondiscriminatory taxes on goods which are no longer
imports or subjects of interstate commerce may not be infringed upon
under the guise of federal regulation. Relying upon Tres Ritos Ranch
Co.," the court formulated a test to determine when goods lose their
character as imports: whether "there is more than mere storage in a
manner reasonably consistent with the nature of the property. ...
Accordingly, the court found that the committing of bonded ores to
the smelting and refining process ended their local tax immunity.
Distinguishing cases cited by the plaintiff,4 the court concluded that
neither the regulations nor precedent reveals a congressional intent to
interfere with the right .of the states to tax goods imported for and
appropriated to processing for domestic consumption. Furthermore,
the right to tax is not foreclosed if the importer has withheld payment
of the duty and given a bond to secure such payment.4 1
Considering the constitutional issues involved in the instant case,
the court has overlooked a fundamental principle and has exhibited
confusion in' attempting to distinguish commerce clause and importexport clause considerations. The court concluded that imported goods
in bonded warehouses lose their status as imports when appropriated
to the smelting process for domestic consumption. Although this
determination may be justified, the court failed to consider a
fundamental principle: goods retain their status as imports until they
are "incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the
country. ' 48 By applying the "current operational needs" test of
involved goods in bonded warehouses which were constitutionally immune from state taxation
under the import-export clause. Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. 29 (1871); Blount v. Munroe, 60 Ga. 62
(1878). The court also indicated that the scope of the regulation was limited since it was "merely

a footnote."
44. 44 N.M. 556, 105 P.2d 1070 (1940). See note 14 supra.
45. 77 Cal. Rjftr. at 601.
46. The court distinguished Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324
(1964), McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1940), and National Distillers Prods. Corp.
v. City & County, 141 Cal. App. 2d 651, 297 P.2d 61 (1956), by stating that tax immunity rested
upon the constitutional prohibition against taxation of goods involved in the stream of commerce.
During v. Valente, 267 App. Div. 383, 46 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1944), was distinguished since the court
found that the statute in During created a foreign trade zone. The Ohio cases of Republic Steel
Corp. v. Porterfield, 14 Ohio St. 2d 101, 236 N.E.2d 661 (1968), and Orr Felt & Blanket Co. v.
Schneider, 3 Ohio St. 2d 14, 209 N.E.2d 150 (1965), were found to be not inconsistent with the
court's holding because in each case the immunity was derived from the import-export clause's
protection of goods whose importation journey has not ended.
47. The court further concluded that the laws and regulations governing traffic in gold did
not preempt the right of states to tax or regulate that traffic.
48. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 441 (1827).
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers," the court has ignored the

distinction between the processing of duty-free goods in which the
government has no interest and the processing of goods upon which the
duty has not been paid and a bond is outstanding. The appropriation
to and processing of duty-free imports falls clearly within the
Youngstown guidelines. On the other hand, a governmental interest in
the dutiable goods may give them a character which justifies the
conclusion that they have not become mingled with the mass of
domestic property. Moreover, keeping these goods "separate and
distinct from nonbonded material until they have been sampled and
weighed"5 clearly indicates that immunity should extend at least until
the sampling and weighing. If sampling and weighing are part of the
smelting process, then all ores and concentrates appropriated to the
manufacturing process and essential to the current operational needs
should be free from local taxation. A proper inquiry should include a
consideration of whether the government's control and regulation of
the imports has kept them "separate" from the mass of goods in this
country 51
In construing article 942 of the Customs Regulations of 1931, the
court has ignored the plain meaning of the regulation and has given it
an interpretation that renders it meaningless. A federal regulation,
which has been in effect for 55 years and has been held to have been
incorporated into the Tariff Act of 1930 by the Supreme Court of the
United States, 2 should not be dismissed by stating that "there was no
such regulation, but merely a footnote." 3 The court's statement that
any congressional regulation intended to prevent state taxation of such
goods would be unconstitutional is clearly without merit.
Congressional power over interstate commerce is full and plenary, and
under that power "Congress can fix the bounds of state taxation of
that commerce."54 If the Customs Regulations' absolute prohibition
against state and local taxation of imports in bonded warehouses is
taken as a correct interpretation of congressional intent, the instant
court's decision may conceivably result in a specific congressional
restraint of such taxation. This will be particularly true if the burden
49.

358 U.S. 534 (1959).

50. 19 C.F.R. § 19.17(f) (1969).
51. The court only considered whether there was "use" of the goods in a manner
reasonably consistent with the nature of the property. 77 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
52. McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414,426 (1940).
53. 77 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
54. Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income From a Multistate Business, 13 VAND,
L. REv.21, 122 (1959).
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of local taxation adversely affects the competitive advantage of
domestic smelters and refiners.5
Throughout its discussion of the question of preemption, the court
seems to have donfused commerce clause considerations with those
normally applied to the import-export clause. Such confusion is most
evident in the court's attempt to distinguish McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil
Co. Congressional power over commerce is separate and distinct from
the constitutional prohibition against state taxation of imports.
Although the oil involved in McGoldrick was constitutionally protected
under the import-export clause,56 this in no way limits the Court's
finding that the "statutes and regulations taken together" 57 are a
regulation of commerce which preempts state taxation. The relevant
consideration is that congressional intent to preempt taxation of
pretroleum destined for foreign commerce was clearly evident in
McGoldrick;5 8 whereas, in the instant case, such clear intention is not
present. Although the court's finding that the government has a
security interest in the bonded ore is not unreasonable, it is suggested
that an attempt by the county to collect outstanding property taxes
would presenta situation inconsistent with the congressional purpose.
The conclusion that local taxation is not preempted by federal
regulation might be justifiable in this close question. It is hoped,
however, that a more precise statement of the considerations underlying
the decision will result from the forthcoming appeal.

Labor Law-Collective Bargaining- Employer's Widely
Publicized Stance of Unbending Firmness Indicates Bad Faith
Following several months of negotiations and a three week strike,,
which ended in capitulation by the Union and a settlement on the
55. The trial court had found that an attempt to pass the effect of the tax down to the
supplying-producers would result in plaintiff's losing its business to foreign smelters. 77 Cal. Rptr.

at 587.
56. "The salient distinction is that the provisions governing a manufacturing warehouse,
such as that in which the imported crude petroleum was manufactured into fuel oil in the Gulf
Oil case, limit withdrawal and sale of the product to the export trade . . . whereas, under the
provisions governing bonded smelting and refining warehouses, all or any part of the product may
be introduced into domestic commerce ...
" 77 Cal. Rptr. at 595-96.
57. McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Co., 309 U.S. 414, 427 (1940).
58. Sections 601 and 630 of the Revenue Act of 1932, as amended, May 28, 1938, ch. 209,
47 Stat. 169, ch. 289, § 705(a), 52 Stat. 570, exempted such petroleum from local taxation. See
note 37 supra.
I. The strike began on Oct. 2, 1960, and ended 22 days later.
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Company's terms, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (hereinafter IUE)Y filed unfair labor
practice charges against General Electric. Prior to the formal

bargaining period, GE had unilaterally offered an insurance program
on a no-bargaining basis. 3 During the negotiations, GE refused to

compromise,4 withheld requested information,' attempted to deal
separately with IUE locals,6 and utilized a massive publicity campaign
criticizing the bargaining conduct of Union representatives and
advertising the Company's policy of adherence to its "firm, fair
offer. ' 7 The NLRB, adopting the findings of the Trial Examiner,' held
that General Electric had committed three specific unfair labor
practices, 9 and, by "consciously placing itself in a position where it
could not give unfettered consideration" to Union proposals, had failed
2. In 1960, about half of GE's 250,000 employees were unionized. The IUE represented
about 70,000 GE workers, grouped into over 100 bargaining units. The Company dealt with the
Union through the IUE's General Electric Conference Board, composed of delegates elected from
IUE locals and empowered by the locals to negotiate, call strikes, and conclude contracts.
3. Shortly before the opening of formal negotiations, GE notified the Union that it was
planning to institute unilaterally a personal accident insurance plan. After the Union objected,
GE replied that it would make the plan available to non-union employees only.
4. Although GE did alter its offer during negotiations, the changes were relatively
insignificant.
5. GE refused both oral and written requests for data needed to compute the cost of
proposals. The instant court concluded that this refusal resulted in the Union being unable to
bargain intelligently.
6. The Trial Examiner's findings that GE had attempted to deal separately with several
IUE locals were affirmed by the Second Circuit. The court also found that the terms offered to
2 locals were better than those offered to the national negotiators.
7. GE's publicity program was essential to the Company's unique approach to collective
bargaining. This approach is commonly referred to as "Boulwareism" and is named after Lemuel
R. Boulware, a former GE vice-president. The technique is basically an application of GE's
consumer merchandising methods to the employment relations field. GE solicits information on
the desires of the work force and attempts to translate this information into specific proposals
which are both attractive to the employees and within the Company's means. GE then uses its
public relations and advertising skills to sell the proposals to the employees and the public. In
1960, the Company described its proposals as a "firm, fair offer," characteristic of its desire to
"do right voluntarily" without the need for Union pressure. GE also declared that although it
would be willing to accept Union suggestions based on facts the Company might have overlooked,
the offer would not be changed merely to avoid a strike. The Company denounced the traditional
give and take of so-called "auction bargaining" as "pointless haggling."
8. The Trial Examiner's findings are appended to the decision of the Board. General
Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 203 (1964).
9. The Board found that GE had committed 3 separate violations of the duty to bargain
by refusing to provide requested information, by attempting to deal separately with the IUE
locals, and by unilaterally presenting the insurance program. 150 N.L.R.B. at 193. Section 8(a)(5)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964), provides: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees ..
"
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to bargain in good faith. 0 In its petition for review of the Board's

order, GE contended that the Company's intransigence and publicity
techniques had statutory approval" and could not be used to support

a finding of bad faith. Refusing to accept this position, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, order enforced. During collective

bargaining, an employer who assumes a widely publicized stance of
unbending firmness, and thereby destroys his own ability to alter a
an
position once taken, refuses to baram in fact, and demonstrates
absence of subjective good faith. ?IJLRB v. General Electric Co., 418
F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Mar.
3, 1970) (No. 1064).
The employer's duty to bargain, as originally conceived by
Congress, required only that he meet and confer with the representative
of his employees. 12 From the outset, however, the NLRB regulated the
quality of negotiations by requiring a "sincere desire to reach
agreement.' 3 In 1947, Congress attempted to define the bargaining
duty 4 under the NLRA by enacting section 8(d), which provides that

an employer is obligated to "confer in good faith," but not to agree
or make concessions.

5

The good faith standard was designed to isolate

the employer who, through perfunctory negotiation, attempted to avoid
both agreement and a Board finding of refusal to bargain. 6 Since
various courts determined that it was easier to define bad faith rather
10. 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 196 (1964).
Ii. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964): "[T]o bargain collectively is . . . the mutual obligation
. . . to meet . . . and confer in good faith with respect to . . . terms and conditions of
employment . . . but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession.
... (Emphasis added). 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964): "The
expressing of any views, argument, or opinion. . . shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice . . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit." (Emphasis added).
12. Senator Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, declared:
"When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have selected their
representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to the door of their employer and
say, 'Here they are, the legal representatives of your employees.' What happens behind those
doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it." 79 CONG. REc. 7660
(1935).
13. 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 85-86 (1937). See also NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118
F.2d 874 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
14. The fear was expressed in Congress that the Board had "gone very far, in the guise of
determining whether or not employers had bargained in good faith, in setting itself up as the judge
of what concessions an employer must make and of the proposals and counterproposals that he
may or may not make." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1947).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). See note I I supra.
16. For a full discussion of the history of § 8(d), see Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good
Faith, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1401 (1958).
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than good faith, the basic test became whether the totality of the
employer's conduct demonstrated "a desire not to reach an

agreement.' ' 1 7 Thus bad faith was held to be demonstrated by
intentional stalling, 8 insistance upon patently unreasonable terms, 9 or
withholding from the negotiator authorization to bind the employer.20
In certain cases, however, employer acts constituted per se refusals to
bargain; therefore, the good faith question was not reached. These per

se violations included refusing to discuss a mandatory subject,2'
unilaterally changing employment benefits during negotiations, 2 and
refusing to supply relevant information.23 Although not verbalized, the
development of the per se approach may reflect the decreasing
pertinence of the traditional test of good faith when the parties have
actually reached agreement. In United Steelworkers v. NLR B,24 the

D.C. Circuit concluded that although the employer intended to sign a
contract with the union, his refusal to compromise on the dues checkoff
issue was motivated by a desire to undermine union strength.

Therefore, the employer had failed to bargain in good faith in spite of
his desire to agree. Even though the Supreme Court has never reviewed
such a finding, the Court's decision in NLRB v. Katz2 9 is relevant.
After holding that the employer had committed a per se violation of
the duty to bargain, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the
good faith issue and declared in dictum that the Board had authority
to proscribe any behavior "which is in effect a refusal to negotiate, or

which directly obstructs or inhibits the actual process of discussion, or
which reflects a state of mind against reaching agreement.
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17. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
887 (1953). For a discussion of the development of this test, see Cox, supra note 16, at 1417-28.
18. See, e.g., NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 887 (1953).
19. See. e.g., Majurev .LRB, 198 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952).
20. See, e.g., NLRBv. Hibbard, 273 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1960).
21. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). See also NLRB v. Wooster Div. of BorgWarner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
22. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). See also May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB,
326 U.S. 376 (1945); NLRB v. Shannon, 208 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1953).
23. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
24. 390 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968). This decision was
rendered over the dissent of Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger who declared it to be a "novel and
internally inconsistent proposition that a bargainer can be found to have refused to bargain in
good faith even while at the same time it is found to have engagid in bargaining in a good faith
effort to reach an agreement and has actually reached a final and binding contract." Id. at 853
(dissenting opinion).
25. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
26. Id. at 747. The Court also declared that the duty to bargain 'in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . .. ' [m]ay be violated without
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The 1947 congressional definition of bargaining duty was part of
a larger attempt to delineate the permissible scope of NLRB activity.

Consequently, section 8(c), which provides that noncoercive expression
of opinion "shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice, '27 was also added to the Act. The legislative history of this
section reveals only isolated criticism 28 of its broad scope and no
consideration of its possible application in the collective bargaining
context. 29 Subsequent cases reflected the tension between an employer's
obligation to bargain in good faith and his right to communicate with

his employees. The NLRB and the courts have uniformly outlawed

"employer [attempts] to disregard the bargaining representatives by
negotiating with individual employees ' 30 on the ground that such

communications violated the exclusivity requirement. 3' On the other
hand, when bargaining table conduct was satisfactory, employer

publicity explaining or justifying bargaining proposals has been
permitted. 32 Although employer criticisms of union officials have
generally been allowed, 33 NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp.34 held such
a communication to be evidence of bad faith on the ground that it was
a "calculated attempt to undermine union prestige. '35 The consensus

seems to be that section 8(c) is co-extensive with the first amendment,
and that if employer speech tends to undermine the process of collective

bargaining, the policy goal of labor peace will outweigh the privilege
of section 8(c).36
a general failure of subjective good faith . . . . A refusal to negotiate in fact . . .
violates § 8(a)(5) though the employer has every desire to reach agreement with the union upon
an over-all collective agreement and earnestly and in all good faith bargains to that end." Id. at
742-43.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964). See note II supra.
28. The few criticisms made were related to employer coercion during union organizing
campaigns.
29. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 23 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33, 84 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947); 93
CONG. REc. 6446 (1947).
30. Medo Photo Supply Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 (1944). See also The Stanley
Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 734 (1954).
31. Under § 9(a) of the NLRA, a union selected by a majority of the employees is the
"exclusive representative" of all the employees in the bargaining unit, including those who voted
against the union. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1954).
32. See Joseph E. Cote, 101 N.L.R.B. 1486 (1952); United Welding Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 954
(1947).
33. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1114, enforced, 216 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1954)
("communist"); C. Pappas Co., 82 N.L.R.B.-765 (1949) ("racketeers").
34. 313 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963) (posted notice charging union
officials with delay in making wage increases effective).
35. Id. at 268.
36. In a recent case, the Supreme Court declared that "§ 8(c) . . . merely implements the

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23

In the instant case, Judge Kaufman, writing for the majority, first
affirmed the Board's finding that GE committed three specific
violations of its duty to bargain 7 and then confronted the good faith
issue. After noting that the proper approach was to consider "the
totality of the circumstances," the court found that although the
Company desired to reach agreement, 3 its bargaining tactics were
designed primarily to Jubvert the Union by dealing "with the Union
through the employees, rather than with the employees through the
Union. '39 Recognizing that GE's publicity campaign was essential to
this approach, he ruled that such publicity was not immunized by
section 8(c) since the purpose of that section was to impose a "rule of
relevancy;" a literal reading would "emasculate a statute whose
structure depends heavily on evaluation of motive and intent." 0 The
majority found that the purpose of the publicity was to convince the
employees that the Company's offer was in their best interes.s and that
employee support of a strike would not pressure GE into a change.
Since the effect of the publicity was to label any concession a defeat,
and thus to discourage compromise, the- publicity was evidence of GE's
bad faith intent to rely upon its results "to the virtual exclusion of
genuine negotiations."" Finding support in the broad dictum of Katz,"
the court concluded that GE's conduct was tantamount to negotiating
with a mind closed to compromise. In a concurring opinion, Judge
Waterman conceded that GE's hard bargaining tactics, standing alone,
were not indicative of bad faith; however, the Company's "widely
publicized stance of unbending firmness" made them unfair. Therefore,
"the Company should not be permitted to advertise to its employees
that it believes in the firmness of its offers for the sake of firmness." 3
Judge Friendly, in a dissenting opinion, observed that a finding of a
First Amendment" and used a balancing technique to support its finding that employer speech
had coerced the employees. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969). For an
analysis of § 8(c) in constitutional terms, see Symposium-Restriclionson Employer's Right of
Free-Speech During Organizing Campaigns and Collective Bargaining, 63 Nw.U.L. REv. 40
(1968).
37. See notes 9 supra & 51 infra.

38. Judge Kaufman argued, however, that the desire to reach agreement "must mean more
than a willingness to sign a piece of paper." Furthermore, he indicated that GE's refusal to budge
from its original offer was inconsistent with "a serious effort to resolve differences and reach a
common ground." 418" F.2d at 761-62.

39. Id. at 759.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at761.
Id. at 759.
See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
418 F.2d at 763-64.
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"desire not to reach an agreement with the union '" 44 should be a
prerequisite to any finding of bad faith, and that without such a finding
the "totality of the circumstances" approach became subjective and
indefinite. Furthermore, Judge Friendly contended that GE's "firm,
fair offer" and firmness publicity were specifically protected by
sections 8(d) and 8(c), 45 and that the majority decision constituted a
serious intrusion into the realm left to the parties by Congress.
The advocates of the traditional good faith standard46 contend that
if an employer's bargaining proposals are not patently unreasonable,
any attitude short of a desire to avoid agreement cannot be construed
as bad faith. Thus, by definition, where the parties have conferred and
reached agreement, the issue of good faith does not arise. This presents
the problem of whether to abandon the good faith requirement as
inappropriate to this situation, or to retain it and develop broader
47
implementing standards. The per se refusal to bargain approach
dspouses the former since the employer's subjective attitude is irrelevant
to its operation. The majority in the instant case, however, took a bold
step in the latter direction. Their test of good faith is not simply
whether the employer desires agreement, but how much he desires this
result.48 The rationale of the decision appears to be that any employer
bargaining tactic which has the effect of limiting the union's influence
on the results of the bargaining process and which is primarily
motivated by a desire to prevent union "moral victories" indicates bad
faith. 4 9 In sum, the decision could be interpreted to stand for the
proposition that anti-union animus, to the extent that it influences
bargaining tactics, is bad faith. The result of the decision,
will be to force the employer to be far more accommodating of union
interests. First, it effectively requires that an employer engage in
"auction bargaining," since intransigence inevitably raises the question
44. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
45. 418 F.2d at 765: "Conformably with the dictates of the First Amendment, Congress,
when it enacted § 8(c) determined the dangers that free expression might entail for successful
bargaining were a lesser risk than to have the Board police employer or union speech."
46. See, e.g., the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger in United
Steelworkers v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 846, 853 (D.C. Cir.)l cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968).
47. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
48. Judge Kaufman characterized GE's conduct as "inconsistent with a genuine desire to
reach a mutually satisfactory accord." 418 F.2d at 737. The implication is that an employer
must not only desire to agree, but he must also desire an agreement with which the union will be
satisfied.
49. Id. at 758: "The Board might reasonably infer that its prime purpose was to avoid
recognizing the Union's status as bargaining representative of the striking employees, and not to
further any legitimate business aim."
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of anti-union motive. Moreover, when the granting of a union demand
would not significantly burden the employer, the question of anti-union

motive may become a presumption. Secondly, the new "good faith"
severely restricts the use of employer propaganda by suggesting that
any attempt to secure employee support may be evidence of bad faith.
It is submitted that the long term results of this policy will not only
encourage antagonism between management and employees, but will

also increase union strength and bargaining power. On the other hand,
employee communications by the negotiating parties can provide a
valuable check on either party's misuse of its bargaining power.
Employees in one bargaining unit, for example, may be "used" by
union officials to gain a contract which sets a precedent for other
employers. l The employer who must rely on organized labor is at a
distinct disadvantage in this situation and should be allowed to

publicize his position to those who benefit from collective bargaining.
A concept which does not meet these pragmatic standards should be

discarded as inworkable, even if valid in theory. After agreement by
the parties, the better solution would be to continue and to extend the

doctrine of the "per se refusal to bargain." This approach places
proper emphasis on the objective bargaining table conduct of the
parties and has already produced a substantial "common law" of
bargaining, which is sufficient to have resolved the instant case.5 '

Labor Law-State Anti-Injunction Statute Not Applicable to
Disputes Concerning Public Employees
Appellee, a municipal school corporation, sought and obtained a
restraining order directing appellant, a public school teachers' union,
to refrain from picketing and striking against appellee.' At a hearing
50. It is interesting to note that this situation may currently exist. The 1969, GE-IUE
negotiations have followed a pattern similar to those of 1960. GE has taken full-page
advertisements in leading publications declaring that a "union power coalition" is the real force
behind the current strike against GE. The advertisements also state that "the primary goal of
the union coalition is to prolong the strike-at the expense of General Electric employees. This
is an apparent attempt to force a super-inflationary General Electric settlement, which these
unions could then use as the basis for further negotiations in other industries." Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 29, 1969, at 9. GE has filed unfair labor practice charges against the IUE for
allegedly refusing to bargain.
51. The court sustained the Board's finding that GE hAd committed 3 specific violations
of § 8(a)(5), each of which was characterized, with ample precedent, as a per se refusal to
bargain. Therefore, the resolution of Boulwareism with good faith could have been avoided.

I. Appellant had instituted a strike against appellee and established picket lines at various
schools after salary negotiations had been unsuccessful. Although only a small percentage of the
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to adjudge whether the teachers' union was in contempt of court for
the continuation of the picketing without regard to the restraining
order, appellant contended that Indiana's "Little Norris-LaGuardia
Act ' 2 was applicable and, since the trial court did not follow the

procedures required by that statute, it had no jurisdiction to issue the
order.3 The trial court found appellant in contempt of court for
violation of the restraining order. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Indiana, held, affirmed. Since the state's anti-injunction law is not
applicable to disputes concerning public employees and strikes by

public employees are illegal, the strike and picketing by appellant to
compel satisfactory contract negotiations was properly enjoined.
Anderson Federation of Teachers, Local 519 v. School City of
Anderson, 251 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. 1969).

While public sector collective bargaining has been expressly and
tacitly recognized in a growing number of states, 4 the right of public
erhployees 5 to strike in furtherance of collective bargaining has been

uniformly denied. Strikes by government employees are prohibited by
federal' and state statutes; the marked judicial inclination has been to
public school teachers participated in the strike and the picketing was at all times peaceful,
evidence disclosed that school children were unloaded from buses in public streets because of the
presence of the picket lines. It was this action by appellant that precipitated the temporary
restraining order.
2. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-501 to -514 (Burns Repl, 1965). The state anti-injunction statute
is an exact copy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
3. The statute sets out procedures that must be followed by a trial court in order to get
jurisdiction to enjoin a strike. "No court of the state of Indiana, as herein defined, shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conforrity with the provisions of
this act ....
" IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-501 (Burns Repl. 1965). Appellant contended that the
issuance of the order without notice or a hearing was violative of § 40-501. Furthermore, the
union alleged that it was entitled to a jury trial on the contempt charge, as required by § 40511.
4. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153d (Supp. 1967); MICH. ComP. LAWS
ANN. § 423.209 (1967).
5. The term "public employee" is usually defined very broadly to include anyone holding
a position by employment or appointment in the government of the state or any municipal
corporation, county, township, or political subdivision thereof. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4117.01 (Baldwin 1968).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (Supp. IV, 1965-68).
7. The legislatures of 16 states have passed no-strike statutes: CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 10-153e (Supp. 1967) (school teachers specifically); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221 (1965);
GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1301 (1963); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 86-2 (1968); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
149, § 178m (Supp. 1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(2) (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §. 179.51
(1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-821 (1960); N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 210(1) (McKinney Supp.
1969); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.02 (Baldwin 1968); ORE.'REV. STAT. § 243.760 (Repl.
1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.2 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-1 (1968) (school
teachers specifically); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5154c(3) (1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 40-65 (Repl.
1953); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(1) (Supp. 1969).
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designate strikes against governmental employers as illegal per se. 8 One
of the reasons for denying the right to strike is that public employee
strikes derogate the sovereignty of government.' Since issues such as
wages, hours, and working conditions are determined through the
exercise of the legislative power, strikes by governmental employees
impair sovereignty by pressuring the legislature to delegate or bargain
away its authority. Another reason for the prohibition is that strikes
are thought to be the equivalent of a rebellion against government
approaching the level of treason."' A third reason is the possible danger
to public health and safety that may result." Finally, the rationale that
public employees have a higher obligation to refrain from interfering
with the operation of government is often utilized to justify the
limitation; 2 public employees are assumed to accept a fiduciary
relationship by entering public employment. There has been some
dissatisfaction with these reasons for finding public employee strikes
illegal per se.' 3 A few courts have adopted an approach requiring
inquiry into-the circumstances of the particular strike." Although the
issue is brought before the courts in diverse forms, it is most often
raised in injunction proceedings brought by the public employer. Such
8. E.g., Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951) (declaratory
judgment holding that public workers have no right to strike); Board of Educ, v. Redding, 32
I1l. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) (holding that public employees have no right to interfere with
a governmental function); City of Manchester v. Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59
(1957) (denying teachers' strikes because such strikes would be rebellions against government),
But see Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Project, 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954) (strike by
employees of agricultural improvement district not illegal).
9. See Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194
(1946); Electric Sys. v. Vick, 43 Tenn. App. 524, 309 S.W.2d 792 (1957); Note, The Strike And
Its Alternatives In Public Employment, 1966 Vis. L. REV. 549, 554.
10. See City of Cleveland v. Division 268 of Amal. Ass'n, 85 Ohio App. 153, 90 N.E.2d
711 (1949); Note, Union Activity In Public Employment, 55 CoLuM. L. REv. 343, 360 n. II
(1955).
11. This premise is discernible in the courts' rationales in Donevero v. Incinerator Auth.,
75 N.J. Super. 217, 222, 182 A.2d 596, 599 (L. -Div. 1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nonm.,
McAleer v. Incinerator Auth., 79 N.J. Super. 142, 190 A.2d 891 (App. Div. 1963); Port of Seattle
v. International Longshoremen's Union, 52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958).
12. See generally McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18
(1892); Note, supra note 9, at 555 n.39.
13. See Los Angeles v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d
305 (1949); Local 266, IBEW v. Dam Auth., 292 P.2d 1018 (Okla. 1956); Note, Labor Relations
In The Public Sector. 75 HARV. L. REV. 391,408 (1961).
14. TI'e traditional governmental-proprietary distinction has been occasionally utilized to
permit public employees engaged in proprietary functions to strike against their governmental
employer. See Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Project, 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954). Most
courts have held this distinction inapposite since all governmental activities are equally services
for the general public. See, e.g., Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d
741 (1946).
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requests for injunctive relief have been sustained in spite of antiinjunction statutes, a result contrary to the prevailing private sector

policy of protecting striking employees from judicial interference. In
United States v. United Mine Workers,'5 the United States Supreme
Court held that the restrictions on the issuance of injunctions in labor
disputes found in the Norris-LaGuardia Act" did not apply to the
United States Government as an employer. The Court premised its
construction of the term "employer" as used in the Act on the ancient
English rule that "statutes which in general terms divest .pre-existing

rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express

words to that effect."' 7 Since the state courts almost uniformly have
reached similar results in determining the application of state antiinjunction statutes,' the courts have readily granted injunctive relief

against strikes and picketing by public employees. State courts,
however, have cited a number of different reasons for reaching
decisions so contrary to the prevailing policy in the private sector.
Some of the cases 9 follow the rationale of United States v. United
Mine Workers; implicit in these decisions is a finding that the history

and terms of the state act are comparable with the federal act. 20
Ignoring the construction question, ia-few courts have held that public
employee strikes and picketing serve an illegal purpose and are not
within the purview of the statutorily protected labor activity 2 Other
15. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1964). The purpose of the Act was to promote free employee choice
by divesting the federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in designated classes of labor
disputes.
17. 330 U.S. at 272. For other applications of this exclusionary rule, see Guarantee Title
& Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 224 U.S. 152 (1912); United States v. Stevenson, 215
U.S. 190 (1909). The Court in United Mine Workers did not rely entirely on the exclusionary
rule; it noted the contrast between the "individual unorganized worker" and the "'owners of
property" contained in the statement of purposes of the Act, which, on its face, does not purport
to apply to the Government. 330 U.S. at 274.
18. Twenty-six states have adopted anti-injunction laws; 12 had passed statutes before the
enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932. An additional 12 adopted such laws for the first
time in the decade following 1932. Most, but not all, of the later state statutes are modeled after
the federal statute. See generally U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS. DEP'T OF LABOR. BULL.

No. 250,

STATE ANTI-INJUNCTION LAWS

(1962).

19. See. e.g., Hansen v. Commonwealth, 334 Mass. 214, 181 N.E.2d 843 (1962) (citing
United States v. United Mine Workers for the rule of statutory construction that general words
will not be construed to include the state); City of Pawtucket v. Teachers' Alliance, Local 930,
87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958) (statute did not intend to withdraw from the state its existing
rights to injunctive relief against its own employees).
20. See Delaware River & Bay Auth. v. International Organ. of Masters, Mates & Pilots,
45 N.J. 138, 211 A.2d 789 (1965) (history and terms of Rhode Island statute comparable to
federal statute).
21. See Fair Share Organ., Inc. v. Mitnick, 134 Ind. App. 675, 188 N.E.2d 840 (1963)
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courts have found that anti-injunction statutes do not bar injunctions
against striking public employees for reasons of public policy" or
because of other state legislationP Only one court has followed an antiinjunction policy in strikes involving public employees 4
In the instant case the court found no basis for applying the state
anti-injunction statute to disputes concerning public employees. Noting
that the Supreme Court had rejected the application of the NorrisLaGuardia Act to such disputes, 25 the majority reasoned that the
Court's utilization of the exclusionary rule and its interpretation of the
purposes of the federal act2 were propositions equally applicable to the
Indiana statute? The court further found that this construction had
been followed in most other state jurisdictions in order to grant
injunctions. Concluding that strikes by public employees would result

in anarchy, the court held that such strikes were illegal; 28 therefore the
instant strike was properly enjoined, and the trial court was correct in
its judgment of contempt of court. 29 Two dissenting judges disagreed
with the conclusion that the anti-injunction statute was inapplicable;3
(picketing for an unlawful purpose not immune from injunctive relief); City of Minot v. General
Drivers & Helpers Union, Local 74, 142 N.W.2d 612 (N.D. 1966) (peaceful picketing for an illegal
purpose enjoinable).
22. Compare Turnpike Auth. v. American Fed'n of State, County & Municipal Employees,
Local 1511, 83 N.J. Super. 389, 200 A.2d 134 (1964) (statute not intended to protect the interests
of public employees), with Westchester County v. Federation of Labor, 115 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup.
Ct. 1952) (matter of public policy for courts to have unrestrained power to act promptly).
23. E.g., Petrucci v. Hogan, 5 Misc. 2d 480, 27 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (antiinjunction statute found to be in pari materia with state labor relations act that specifically
excluded public employees). Compare Board of Educ. v. Public School Employees' Union, Local
63, 233 Minn. 144, 45 N.W.2d 797 (1951) (anti-injunction statute held applicable through
principle that exclusion of one results in inclusion of all others), with City of San Diego v.
American Fed'n of State, County & Municipal Employees, Local 127, 3 LAD. L. REP. (1969 CCH
52,177 (Cal. Super. June 9, 1969) (prohibition of certain public employee strikes
Lab. Cas.)
indicates that the legislature has refused to outlaw all strikes by public employees).
24. School Dist. v. Education Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968). The Michigan
Supreme Court held that it was insufficient merely to show that concerted, prohibited action by
public employees had taken place and that ipso facto such a showing justified injunctive relief.
"We so hold because it is basically contrary to public policy in this State to issue injunctions in
labor disputes absent a showing of violence, irreparable injury, or breach of the peace." Id. at
326, 157 N.W.2d at 210.
25. The court cited United States v. United Mine Workers as enunciating the principle that
public employees did not have a right to strike and that injunctive processes might properly be
used to prevent such strikes. 251 N.E.2d at 16.
26. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
27. 251 N.E.2d at 17.
28. Id. at 18.
29. One judge who previously had announced his intention not to participate in the decision
concurred. Id. at 18. The Indiana Supreme Court is a 5-judge court.
30. id. at 19.
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they distinguished the reasoning of United Mine Workers because of a
state statute extending the term "person" to the sovereign.3 1
Furthermore, the minority, noting that the legislature had never
declared that all strikes by governmental employees were illegal,
refused to accept an illegal per se rule against peaceful strikes
regardless of impact.32 The dissenters preferred an inquiry into the

particular facts to determine the actual amount of disruption.
The instant court's decision to deny public employees the right to
strike by restricting the application of the state anti-injunction statute
is a correct assessment of decisional law33 and legislative history.3 4 The
court's rationale, however, appears to be a doubtful basis for limiting
the rights of public employees. The court ignores both the question of
statutory construction raised by the dissent 5 and other suggestions that
the state's general labor legislation applies to public employees 6 The
court also fails to indicate whether its holding is essentially premised

on statutory construction ,or on the illegal nature of the activity. By
postulating a specter of anarchy in order to deny public employees the
right to strike, the instant decision is completely inadequate in resolving

the complexities of public sector unionism and preventing further
destructive confrontation.37 This is especially unfortunate in view of the

vigorous criticism of court decisions that deny the right to strike to all
public employees

8

Most commentators contend that the illegal per se

31.

IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-4701 (Burns Repl. 1968).
32. The dissenting judges pointed out that the teachers' strike and picketing was completely
peaceful and minimally disruptive of public service rendered by the schools. They thought it
unwise to enjoin a peaceful strike in the absence of any way to insure that the underlying dispute
would be settled amicably. 251 N.E.2d at 22 (dissenting opinion).
33. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
34. Since the Indiana statute is a literal adaptation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it would
have been reasonable for the court to follow the interpretation of the federal act unless additional
considerations were present. See note 35 infra and accompanying text. Moreover, the state statute
was passed at a time when the concept of public sector collective bargaining was unrecognized; it
is fair to conclude that the statute was not meant to apply. See Getman, Indiana Labor Relations
Law: The Casefor a State Labor Relations Act, 42 IND. L.J. 77 (1966).
35. Looking to rules of construction applicable to Indiana statutes, the dissent makes a
forceful argument that the exclusionary rule utilized by the Supreme Court is contrary to
legislative intent. See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.201, .202 (Burns Repl. 1967); id. § 2-4701 (Burns
Repl. 1968); text accompanying note 31 supra.
36. 1966 Ops. Air'y GEN. IND. No. 22; 1944 Ops. Arr'Y GEN. IND. 224, No. 55. Both
opinions seem to assume that general labor legislation was applicable to governmental employees.
See Getman, supra note 34, at 90 n.74.
37. For a rejection of the anarchial approach, see Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment,

67

MIcH.
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931, 959 (1969).

38. See. e.g., Rains, Collective Bargainingin Public Employment, 8 LAB. L.J. 548 (1957);
59 MicH. L. REV. 1260 (1961).
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approach toward public employee strikes deprives governmental
workers of a prerequisite to effective bargaining; they advocate a
qualified right to strike with procedures for the allowance of injunctive
relief after a factual determination of possible injury to public health
and safety39 The dissent in the instant case represents one of the few
judicial expositions of this qualified right to strike approach. Rejecting
as untenable the sovereignty concept, 40 the dissenting judges insist that
the distinction between public and private employees must have a
rational basis in order to avoid violating the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 4t They repudiate the traditional
propositions that public sector employment in all instances can be
rationally distinguished from its private sector counterpart and that
public employee strikes are per se more disruptive than private strikes'
The dissenting opinion concludes that "in the absence of legislation
. . .it is a judicial function to determine whether the amount of the

disruption of the service is so great that it warrants overriding the
legitimate interests of the employees in having effective means to insure
good faith bargaining by the employer. '4 3 This conception of the
judicial function has been criticized for the reason that public policy
resolution of conflicting interests should be left to the legislature. 4
Other authorities argue that the courts can more accurately determine
whether there is danger to the public health and safety when faced with
the facts of each particular case.40 By deferring to the legislature the
legitimization of public employee strikes, this court exercised a judicial
self-restraint that is unrealistic in view of the increase in strikes by
public employees. The decision does little to clarify the legal status of
such strikes.
39. See, e.g., Bloedorn, The Strike and the Public Sector. 20 LAB. L.J. 151 (1969), Khcel.
supra note 37, at 941.
40. The minority points out that the teachers in the instant case were seeking to pressure
choices within the discretion of the local school boards as authorized by the state government:
ergo, they did not seek to destroy the body politic. 251 N.E.2d at 20 (dissenting opinion).
41. The U.S. Supreme Court has prevented states from imposing unreasonable restrictions
upon the privilege of public employment. See. e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)

(policemen, like teachers and lawyers, not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional
rights).
42. For contrary arguments, see Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resohtion in Public
Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 943, 957 (1969).
43. 251 N.E.2d at 22 (dissenting opinion).
44. See. e.g., Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union,
52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958) (legislature better equipped to investigate such matters).
45. See 34 WAsH. L. REv. 216, 220 (1959).
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459

Securities Regulation- Punitive Damages Awarded for Violation
of Rule 10b-5
Plaintiffs' brought a shareholder's derivative action againstthe
defendant corporation and its principal executive officer 2 for alleged

violations of Rule lOb-53 involving material misrepresentations 4 and
omissions5 in proxy solicitations distributed by the defendants to obtain
the stockholders' consent to a merger.' The stockholders sought
exemplary damages from the executive officer for his intimate
connection7 with the alleged fraudulent scheme. This claim was based
I. Plaintiffs, de Haas and Colorado International Corporation, were among public
shareholders of Inland Development Corporation and subsequently became shareholders in
American Industries, Inc., as the survivor of a merger between American, Mutual Industries, Inc.,
and Inland Development Corporation.
2. Defendant Stone was president, chairman of the board, and chief executive officer of
Empire, which was a Colorado corporation. Defendant Empire Petroleum Company was the sole
owner of Mutual Supply Co. and American Industries, Inc. and effectively controlled Inland
Development Corporation, owning 43% of its stock with the remaining 57% being dispersed
among 1400 public shareholders.
3. Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission pursuant
to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964), provides: "It shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national security exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security...
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors."
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1969), provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility or any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security."
4. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants falsely represented that the merged corporation
could "look forward to rapid growth and expansion."
5. American and Mutual, Empire's 2 subsidiaries, were in serious financial trouble.
American's primary asset was a 50% interest in an unproductive oil field worth only $34,800,
but bought for $1,000,000. Mutual had suffered losses of $259,000 since its inception and allegedly
was continuing to lose $10,000 each month. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to disclose
Mutual's losses and that American had contracted to save Empire harmless from Mutual's
creditors. In addition, plaintiffs alleged that it was not disclosed that the American stock was
arbitrarily priced at $5 per share when it actually had little or no worth as of the date of merger.
6. The consolidation occurred during July of 1962 as Empire sold Mutual to American,
and subsequently American merged with Inland Development, with American as the survivor.
7. In addition to defendant Stone's control position of Empire, he was president, chairman
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upon the theory that the violation of Rule lOb-5 was intentional under
general tort law" and compensable by punitive damages. The defendant

officer argued that the damages recoverable for violations of Rule l0b5 were limited by section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act' to
actual damages. The jury returned a verdict for the shareholders.,' On

a post-trial motion to the district court by the corporate official to
vacate the jury's punitive damage award, held,' motion dismissed. A

misrepresentation or omission of material fact, coupled with
defendant's aggravated scienter, may result in the awarding of punitive
damages in a civil action for violation of Rule lOb-5. de Haas v.
Empire Petroleum Corp., 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969).
Congress, in an effort to provide needed protection for investors

in securities, enacted the Securities Act in 1933"t and the Securities
Exchange Act in 1934.12 In order to facilitate plaintiff's prosecutions
of securities violations, courts have held that the anti-fraud provisions
of the two Acts,' 3 although superimposed on the tort of

of the.board, and chief executive officer of American and was president and a director of Inland
Development Corporation. The plaintiffs alleged that Stone failed to disclose that he had exacted
a $20,000 salary from American to be paid with Inland's funds after the merger and that he had
obtained an option to buy 100,000 shares of American stock for $1 per share.
8. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965); W. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 2, 35 (3d
ed. 1964).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a): "The rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in addition
to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover,
through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of." (emphasis added).
10. de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 834 (D. Colo. 1969). The jury awarded
$5,000 exemplary damages against Stone, but found he could recover his salary. The jury also
returned a S10,000 verdict to compensate American for losses suffered in the 1962 merger and a
$50,000 verdict to compensate for interest paid. Finally, the court dismissed plaintiffs' demand
for rescission of an alleged fraudulent 1966 merger of American and Empire Crude Oil Company.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-z (1964).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-ff (1964).
13. In general, there are 5 provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts which seek to prohibit
fraud in securities dealings. For a discussion of these 5 provisions, see A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES
LAW; FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5 § 2.2 (1961); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1421-30 (1961).
Three antifraud provisions were enacted in the Securities Act of 1933:
(1) Section 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964), seeks to prevent untrue statements of
material facts and material omissions from registration statements and provides civil liability
for such fraudulent conduct.
(2) Section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964), deals with untrue statements of material facts
or material omissions from prospectuses and other communications regarding the offer or
sale of securities. Any person engaging in such activity is liable to purchasers.
(3) Section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964), seeks to prevent fraudulent conduct in
the offer or sale of securities in interstate commerce. The section provides:
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
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misrepresentation, 4 are much broader than the common law action. 5
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the SEC under the authority of section

10b of the 1934, Act" in order to close a loophole17 in th6 scheme of

securities regulation. The Rule has broader application than other SEC

regulations as it applies to any person involved in the purchase or sale
of any securities by the use of interstate commerce, the mails, or a

national securities exchange. 8 Since the adoption of Rule lOb-5 courts
have found an implied 19 right of civil recovery for sellers 0 and buyers2'
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
The two remaining anti-fraud provisions take the form of rules promulgated pursuant to sections
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
(1) Rule. 15c 1-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c 1-2 (1969), was promulgated under 15c (now
15c(l)), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1964), in 1937 to prohibit the use of fraudulent devices by
brokers-dealers in the over-the-counter market.
(2) Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969), was promulgated under 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (19641; see note 3 supra for the text.
14. For a discussion of common law misrepresentation, see W. PROSSER, supra note
8, §§ 100-05; 3 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 1430-42.
15. "The fact is that courts have repeatedly said that the fraud provisions in the SEC acts
. . .are not limited to circumstances which would give rise to a common law action for deceit."
3 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 1435. In the common law action for misrepresentation, the plaintiff
must prove that there was a false representation of material fact which he justifiably relied on
and suffered damages. He must also prove that the defendant knew or should have known that
the statement was false (scienter). W. PROSSER,supra note 8, § 100, at 700.
16. See note 3 supra.
17. "The Securities and Exchange Commission today announces the adoption of a rule
prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of securities. The previously
existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The
new rule closes a loophole in the protections against fraud administration by the Commission by
prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their
purchase." SEC Exch. Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
18. Compare SEC Rule lOb-5, supra, note 3, with Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964), supra note 13. It is easy to see why Rule lOb-5 has had the more
expansive development since it extends to sales and purchases and § 17(a) deals only with sales.
See A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, § 2.3.
19. The right of private remedy is not an expressed one under Rule lOb-5. However, such a
right is expressed in §§ I1&I 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Section 11, 15 U.S.C. 77k (1964), provides
that any person mislead by registration information may sue those responsible for faulty
registration. Section 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2) (1964), provides that any person who offers or
sells securities by means of inaccurate prospectus will be liable to the person purchasing the
security, if the purchaser can prove the seller had knowledge of the falsehood.
20. See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965);
Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.
512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (the leading case).
21. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), dismissal affd, 328 F.2d 573
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in suits for violations of the Rule. In doing so, courts have relied both
upon the statutory tort theory 2 and the theory of statutory
voidability.2 3 By reading the 1933 and 1934 Acts in pari materia, some
courts have interpreted the underlying legislative intent as one to
provide "complete and effective sanctions, public and private, with

respect to the duties and obligations imposed ...

.1-2Since

the

buyer's right to a private suit has been implied through the 1933 Act,
it has been held the scienter requirements of sections 1121 and 12(2)2'
of the 1933 Act apply to the buyer-plaintiff in a suit under Rule lOb5? There is a split of authority on the scienter requirement under Rule
(1964); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Trussel v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964). But see Montague v. Electronics Corp.,
76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.
Pa. 1948).
22. This common law doctrine allows a person to recover damages if he is injured by
another's violation of a statute which was passed to protect people in the plaintiff's pogition. W.
PROSSER, supra note 8, § 35. For a discussion of this doctrine with regard to Rule lob-5 cases,
see A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, § 2.4(l)(a). That author points out that RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965) modified RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 286 (1934) and provides
the courts with an option in statutory tort cases. But he concludes "that the liability theory is so
firmly ensconsed in lOb-5 jurisprudence that the later RESTATEMENT is unlikely to have any effect
on it." Id., § 2.4(l)(a) n.57.
23. This theory is based on the language of § 29(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b)
(1964), which provides: "Every contract made in violation of any of the provisions of this [Act]
or of any rule or any regulation thereunder, and every contract . . . the performance of which
involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of...
any provision of this [Act] or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall be void (I) as regards the
rights of any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made
or engaged in the performance of any such contract ...." The reasoning underlying this theory
is that the congressional declaration that certain contracts are void would be of little value unless
a party to the contract could apply to the courts for rescission. See Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, § 2.4(l)(b).
24. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961). For an excellent discussion of implied
civil recovery for buyers and sellers under Rule lOb-5, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, § 2.4(l)(2). See also 3 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 1763-97; Comment, Private Remedies Available Under
Rule lOb-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620-23, (1966); Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange
Act Rule lOb-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 121, 158-67 (1962).
25. Securities Act of 1933, § II (b)(3)(A-D), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b)(3)(A-D) (1964), places
the burden ofproof on the purchaser to show that the seller knew or had reasonable grounds to
know that part of the registration statement was false.
26. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964), provides that the seller of
the security must "sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission ....
27. Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 267 (D. Colo. 1965); Weber
v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228
F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
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lOb-5, but the trend is very much against requiring it.28 Section 28(a)

of the 1934 Act provides that no person can recover more than actual
damages in a suit for violation of the Act.29 On its face this section

would seem to preclude recovery of punitive damages in a 10b-5 suit,
but this section, like a similar section under the 1933 Act,30 has been
subject to divergent interpretations. In a recent decision,3 1 the Second

Circuit held that section 28(a) does preclude recovery of punitive
damages in a suit brought under Rule 10b-5. 3 2 On the other hand, it

has been argued and held that the section 28(a) limitation applies only
to those statutory causes of action specifically enumerated in the Act

and that a lOb-5 action arises from common law tort principles
independent of the Act.3 3
In the instant case, the court initially addressed itself to the

plaintiffs' right to a private claim for damages under section l0b of
the Securities Exchange Act. Citing Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,35

the court reasoned that "the right to pursue a private claim for
damages under 10b-5 arises by virtue of the general tort principle that

the doing of an act prohibited by statute may give rise to an actionable
wrong." s Then interpreting section 28(a), the court stated that the
28. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968); Steven v.
Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965) (by implication); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634,
637 (7th Cir. 1963) (dictum); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961). But see Note,
Scienter and Rule JOb-5, 69 COLUM. L. Rav. 1056 (1969).
29.

See note 9 supra.

30. In 1968 a jury awarded punitive damages for a violation of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act,
but this decision has recently been reversed. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 . Supp.
188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 38 U.S.L.W. 3316
(U.S. Feb. 24, 1970). The confusion in the area is illustrated in this quote from. a recent district
court opinion: "'Punitive damages are not authorized in private actions under § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act .... But it is possible that in the turbid waters of
the 1933 Securities Act plaintiffs may find additional authority for their private suit for damages
under § 17(a) ....

The Green case ... instructs us, 'that punitive damages are permitted under

92,429,
'" Geller v. Bohen, CCH 1969 FED. SEC. L. REP,
the Securities Act of 1933 ....
at 98,033 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1969) (emphasis added).
31. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).
32. The weight of authority supports this position. E.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th
Cir. 1967); Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966); Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co.,
216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955)
(dictum).
33. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Baumel v. Rosen,
283 F. Supp. 128 (D.C. Md. 1968). "The limiting language of 28(a) is treated in 3 Loss, Securities
Regulation (1961 ed.) pp. 1474, 1624, 1793-94, as simply precluding double recovery for common
law fraud and violation of federal law." Id. at 145.
34. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
35. de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Corp., 302 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D. Colo. 1969).
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actual damages limitation applies only to claims for relief which are
"expressly or impliedly created by the Act itself. '38 The court reasoned
that a private claim for damages under lOb-5 rests on general tort law'
and does not depend on the 1934 Act for express or implied authority;
consequently section 28(a) is inapplicable in such cases. The court
followed prior case law37 that held that some elements of scienter must
be shown in order to establish a violation of Rule lOb-5. Thus, the
court concluded that violation of lOb-5 necessarily involves an
intentional tort from which punitive damages may flow when
3
"aggravated scienter" is clearly shown.
Punitive damage awards for securities violations have been
justified as a deterrent against fraud and as an incentive to the private
individual to prosecute small suits that ordinarily would not be
worthwhile.39 There is some question, however, whether punitive
damages are necessary to effectuate the purposes of the federal
securities laws.40 The threat of liability for actual damages coupled with
the possible imposition of criminal p~nalities under the 1934 Act4'
should act as an adequate deterrent for the corporations and officials
dealing in securities. The aggregate of compensatory damages in a class
2
action will usually be burdensome and adequate. to punish offenders.
With no ceiling on the amount which could be awarded and no
guidelines to follow, juries could return astronomical awards which
would be out of proportion to the harm done. 43 Congress should
address itself to the question of whether punitive damages should be
recovered in securities regulation cases. If such awards are deemed to
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Corp., 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969).

39.

"[Punitive] damages are given to the plaintiff over and above the full compensation for

his injuries, for the purpose of punishing the defendant, of teaching him not to do it again, and

*ofdeterring others from following his example." W. PROSSER, TORTS 9 (3d ed. 1964). See Globus
v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cerl. denied 38 U.S.L.W. 3316
(U.S. Feb. 24, 1970); 54 VA. L. REV. 1560 (1968).
40: See Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied
38U.S.L.W. 3316 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970); Green v. Volf, 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).

41. Criminal sanctions are provided in § 32 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78ff (1964).
42. By liberal.rules applicable to class actions and derivative actions by stockholders,
individuals with small claims are encouraged to file suits for securities violations. FED. R. Civ.
P. 23 & 23.1. This increases the probability of a substantial aggregate of compensatory damages.

43.

There are instances of huge and perhaps capricious punitive damages which some juries

have awarded. See, e.g., Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. 130 (1967) ($3 million awarded

inpunitive lamages; later reduced to $400,000).
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be in the best interest of securities regulation, guidelines should be

established to aid juries in the task of making such awards. 41

Although the trend is away from requiring an element of "intent"

in the violation of lOb-5, 45 the present court chose to adopt a "watereddown" version of scienter 6 to establish such a violation. There is merit

in such a requirement if punitive damages are to be awarded under lOb5. If the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act are considered in pari materia,41
the scienter requirements of three private remedies expressly provided

for under sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act and section 18 of the
1934 Act 48 would seemingly apply to lOb-5. Liability under all these
sections is based on fault, and the remedies should be as consistent as
possible. 49 Requiring proof of scienter for the recovery of punitive

damages provides a means of imposing greatest liability on the
informed insider who knowingly breaches his fiduciary duty and at the
same time bars recovery of punitive damages only when the insider acts

in good faith.0
44. It has been suggested that a treble damages provision similar to that of § 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), would provide protection for both investor and
businessman. 22 VAND. L. Rav. 690, 695 (1969). In addition to the award guidelines, Congress
should speak to the problem of when such awards are warranted. If Congress does not establish
these needed guidelines, courts should consciously attempt to define the elements present which
demand an award of punitive damages. In the instanc& case, the court stated that "aggravated
scienter" existed without offering any definition of "aggravated scienter" to guide future courts
in their determination in similar cases. A discussion of standards of scienter under Rule lOb-5 is
found in Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lOB-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 824
(1965) and in Note, supra note 28.
45. See note 28 supra.
46. The term "watered-down" scienter has been used to describe scienter less than open
knowledge necessary for a common law deceit action. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 1766;
Comment, 20 Sw. L.J. supra note 24, at 621.
47. Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 38
U.S.L.W. 3316 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970); Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit
Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule lOb-5, 63 MICH. L. Rav. 1070 (1965).
48. The scienter requirements of §§ 11 & 12(2) are discussed briefly in notes 25 & 26 supra.
Section 18 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964), provides that there is no liability imposed
for a misleading statement in any application, report of document filed. under this title "[if] the
person sued . . . [can] prove that he had no knowledge that such statement was false or
misleading."
49. See Note, supra note 47, at 1078.
50. Id. That author states that if no scienter requirement is imposed under lOb-5, plaintiffs
will naturally utilize this rule with the easiest elements of proof and render the other 3 sections
surplusage.
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Taxation-Alimony Trust-Income Beneficiary of Section 71(a)
Alimony Trust May Exclude Distributions Attributable to Taxexempt Interest When Computing Taxable Income
Plaintiff was the income beneficiary of an alimony trust' created
by her former husband to provide monthly support payments.'
Distributions to plaintiff included trust income consisting of taxexempt interest. 3 Plaintiff reported all distributions from the trust as
ordinary income but, subsequently, filed a claim for refund of the
increment of income tax paid on distributions attributed to tax-exempt
interest. Plaintiff alleged that under section 682 of the Internal Revenue
Code' she qualified as a trust beneficiary and should have been taxed
under the conduit principles5 of sections 652(b) and 662(b), which
exclude from gross income that portion of trust distributions which are
attributable to tax-exempt income. Denying plaintiff's claim, the
Government asserted that section 71(a)7 applied and required plaintiff
1. This term denotes a trust established for the j urpose of making periodic payments in
discharge of a legal obligation imposed on the settlor'under a divorce decree or incurred by him
in a written agreement incident to the decree. See INT. REv.CODE of 1954, § 71 (a).
2. The trust established by Mr. Ellis was to pay plaintiff $1,000 per month and additional
cost-of-living and emergency allowances until her death or remarriage. The payments were to be
made "in the discharge of Mr. Ellis's legal obligation of support and maintenance and alimony."
Brief for Appellant, app. at 29a-30a (Trust Agreement), Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 894 (6th
Cir. 1969).
3. Subsequent to the creation of the trust, the trustee invested in municipal bonds, the
interest from which is exempted from federal income tax by § 103 of the Internal Revenue Code.
4. Section 682 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides: "(a). . . There shall be
included in the gross income of a wife who is divorced or legally separated under a decree of
divorce or of separate maintenance (or who is separated from her husband under a written
separation agreement) the amount of the income of any trust which such wife is entitled to receive
and which, except for this section, would be includible in the gross income of her husband, and
such amount shall not, despite any other provision of this subtitle, be includible in the gross
income of such husband. . . (b). . . For purposes of computing the taxable income of the estate
or trust and the taxable income of.a wife to whom subsection (a) of section 71 applies, such wife
shall be considered as the beneficiary specified in this part. A periodic payment under section 71
to any portion of which this part applies shall be included in the gross income of the beneficiary
in the taxable year in which under this part such portion is required to be included."
5. "[The] trust is treated as a conduit through which the income flows to the beneficiaries
without any change in its character. The result is that a beneficiary is entitled to treat special
classes of income, such as dividends or tax-exempt interest, received through the . . . trust, in
the same manner as if he had received them directly." A. MICHAELSON, INcOME TAXATION OF
ESTATES AND TRusTs 2 (rev. ed. 1966).
6. Section 652(b) governs trusts distributing current incomd only; § 662(b) governs trusts
accumulating income or distributing corpus. INT. REV.CODE of 1954, §§ 652(b), 662(b).
7. Section 74(a)(l) provides that "[i]f
a wife is divorced or legally separated from her
husband under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the wife's gross income includes
periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received after such decree in
discharge of (or attributable to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, in discharge of) a legal

1970]

RECENT CASES

467

to include the full amount of alimony payments in her gross income.

In a suit for the refund brought in federal district court, plaintiff was
granted summary judgment. 8 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals, held, affirmed. Under section 682(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, the beneficiary of a section 71 (a) trust qualifies as a trust

beneficiary as specified in Part I of Subchapter J of the Code and is
entitled under sections 652(b) and 662(b) to exclude from gross income
the portion of trust distributions derived from tax-exempt interest from
municipal bonds.9 Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1969).
Prior to 1942, alimony payments, whether made directly by the

husband"0 or through a trust," were not deductible by the husband or
taxable as income to the wife. 12 Having no statutory indication of
congressional policy with respect to the taxation of alimony,13 the
Supreme Court placed the tax burden on the husband. Any other

determination under then existing law would have resulted in double
ttxation of such payments.14 Seeking an equitable distribution of the
tax burden 5 and the elimination of disparities in tax treatment caused
obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship, is imposed on or incurred by the
husband under the decree or under a written instrument incident to such divorce or separation."
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 71(a)(l).
8. 288 F. Supp. 168 (W.D. Tenn. 1968).
9. The instant court noted with approval the equitable principle of determining questions
of serious doubt as to the taxability of certain income in favor of the taxpayer. 416 F.2d at 897
See cases cited note 41 infra. The court, however, based its determination of the issue upon an
analysis and construction of the relevant statutes. 416 F.2d at 896.
10. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917); see . MICHAELSON, supra note 5, at 85.
11. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935). Douglas was subsequently modified by Supreme
Court decisions which conditioned the income tax liability of a husband for the income of an
alimony trust upon whether he had a continuing obligation to support his former wife under local
law or the trust agreement. See Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80 (1940); Helvering v. Fuller,
310 U.S. 69 (1940); Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149 (1940); A. MICHAELSON, supra note 5.
12. For a detailed discussion of problems arising from the'taxation of alimony payments
prior to 1942, see Gornick, Taxation of Alimony Trusts-A Need for CongressionalReform, 20
TAXES 529 (1942); Paul, Five Years With Douglas v. Willcuts, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1939); Tye,
FederalTaxation ofAlimony Trusts, 19 TAxEs 19 (1941).
13. See Gornick, infra note 16, at 28.
14. Since as a personal expense the alimony payments could not be deducted from his
income, they would have been taxed first to the husband and again to the wife when she received
them. See Gornick, supra note 12, at 533; Lowndes, Community Income and Alimony-Taxation
under the Revenue Act of 1941, 20 TAxEs 3,46-47 (1942).
15. The inequities of the pre-1942 law were summarized during the hearings on the Revenue
Revision of 1942: "Generally speaking, alimony payments are not subject to tax in the hands of
a divorced wife. Even where irrevocable trusts have been established, and the husband has no
further interest in the trust property, the income of the alimony trust is nevertheless taxable to
him because it is used to pay an alimony obligation. Rising tax rates have in some cases absorbed
the entire income of the husband required to pay the tax on his income and that of his divorced
wife. At the same time, divorced wives receiving tax-free alimony possess a privileged status under
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by differences in state laws, 18 Congress, in 1942, amended the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939 by adding section 22(k),17 the substance of which

is now section 71(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Section
71(a), like its predecessor, requires the wife 8 to include in her gross
income periodic alimony payments, whether such payments are made
directly by her husband or from property placed in trust." Legislative
history clearly indicates that Congress intended to tax the beneficiary

of an alimony trust on trust distributions from corpus;." there is no
clear indication, however, of its intention with respect to distributions
from tax-exempt income. 21 Most analysts have concluded that in
computing taxable income the beneficiary of a section 71 (a) trust must
recognize all payments from the trust, including those derived from
interest on tax-exempt securities.22 The determination of the tax
liability of an alimony trust beneficiary is complicated by the
provisions of section 682 which on its face appears to be inconsistent
with the construction commonly given to section 71(a). Section 6822
our tax laws which relieves them of any share of the tax burden." Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Ways & Means on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 1,at 92 (1942)
(statement of Randolph E. Paul, Tax Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury); see S. REP. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942); H.R. RP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-72 (1942).
16. See S. REP. No. -1631, supra-note 15; H.R. REP. No. 2333, supra note 15, at 72;
Gornick, Alimony and the Income Tax, 29 CORNELL L. Q. 28, 34-35 &n.32 (1943).
17. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(k), 56 Stat. 816 (Supp. 1942) (now INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 71).
18. Section 71(a) and the other Code sections discussed herein are directed to the tax
treatment of the spouse who receives alimony payments. To facilitate discussion, the recipient of
the alimony payments will be assumed to be the wife.
19. INr. REv.CODE of 1954, § 71(a).
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.7 1-1(c)(2)-(3) (1957); S.RaP. No. 1631, supra note 15, at 84; H.R.
REP. No. 2333, supra note 15, at 73; note 21 infra. The relevance of the legislative history of the
1942 amendment to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to a determination of congressional intent
in the enactment of section 71(a) in 1954 is demonstrated by the following statement from the
House Report on the 1954 Code revision: "Except for subsection (a)(2) (extending the provision
to cover written separation agreements not under or incident to a court decree), section 71
corresponds to section 22(k) of the 1939 Code, which has been restated for purposes of clarity.
No substantive change is made.
...
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A20-A21
(1954).
21. See Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(c)(3) (1957). Similiar language is found in the legislative
history of § 22(k) of the 1939 Code: "The full amount of periodic payments received under the
circumstances described in section 22(k) is required to be included in the gross income of the
recipient whether such amounts'are derived, in whole or in part, from income received or accrued
by the source to which such payments are attributable." S. REP. No. 1631, supra note 15, at 84.
It is possible to interpret the section as referring simply to the non-exclusion of corpus.
22. See, e.g., Burke, Gift, Estate and Income Tax Problems in Marriage and Divorce
Arrangements, 1959 TUL. TAX INST. 174, 210; CCH 1970 STAND. -FED. TAX REP. 3776.014,
at 41,110 (comparison of Code §§ 71 & 682); Schartz, Income Tax Aspects of Alimony, 42
TAXES 323 (1964); Note, Tax Aspects of Alimony Trusts, 66 YALE L.J. 881, 892 (1957).
23. INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 682. See note 4 supra.
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is the present counterpart of section 1717" of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939 which was enacted concurrently with section 22(k).2 Section
171(a) was intended to exclude from the husband's gross income the

distributions from income of a trust which was in existence prior to the
divorce, which was not created in contemplation of or incident to the

divorce, and the income from which, except for the provisions of
171(a), would be included in the settlor's gross income. 2 Treasury

Regulation section 1.682(a) indicates that this is also the intended

function of section 682(a). 27 However, section 682(b) provides that
"[flor the purpose of computing thetaxable income of. . . a wife to

whom [section 682(a)] or section 71(a) applies, such wife shall be
considered as the beneficiary specified in this part.

'2

Although most

authorities have concluded that section 682(b) simply states the rule
applicable for determining the taxable year in which the beneficiary of

a section 71(a) or 682(a) trust is to include trust distributions in gross

income,29 the provision may also be interpreted as extending to the
alimony trust beneficiary the privileges of beneficiaries of trusts
governed by Subchapter J of the Code.3 1 If the latter construction of

section 682(b) is adopted, the alimony trust beneficiary when
computing her taxable income would, under sections 652(b) and 662(b),
24. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 171, 56 Stat. 817 (Supp. 1942).
25. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
26. See INT. REV. CODE of 1939, ch. 1, § 171, 56 Stat. 817 (Supp. 1942) (now INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 682); S. REp. No. 1631, supra note 15, at 85; H.R. REp. No. 2333, supra note
15, at 73.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-i (a) (3) (1957).
28. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 682(b). "This part" appears to refer to Part I, Subchapter
J, Chapter 1 of the 1954 Code. See Treas. Reg. § 1.682(b)-l(a) (1957).
29. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.682(b)-l (b) (1957); cf. Manella, Current Developments in the
Taxation of Alimony, U. So. CAL. 1948 TAX INST. 43, 77. This position also finds support in
the legislative history of § 171 of the 1939 Code: "The general rules for accounting for the
income of a trust or estate, prescribed in supplement E of chapter 1, apply to that part of any
periodic payment which is a distribution of income of the trust or estate and which is required
under section 22(k) or section 171(a) to be included in the income of the individual receiving such
payment. For the purpose of clarity, this section [now 682(b)] provides that the wife entitled to
receive the payment is considered as the beneficiary of the trust." H.R. REP. No. 2333, supra
note 15, at 73 (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Anita Quinby Stewart, 9 T.C. 195, 198-99 (1947); Harow, Personal tax
problems-The alimony trust: when and how to use this valuable but hazardous (taxwise) device,
6 J. TAX. 365, 369 (1957); ef. A. MICHAELSON, supra note 5, at 86. Illustrative of the rationale
of this interpretation is the following statement of the district court: "The right of beneficiaries
to treat tax-exempt interest earned and distributed by trusts as tax-exempt interest in the hands
of the beneficiaries is a specific right created by Part I of subchapter (J) of the Code...
[Slection 682(b) gives this specific right to beneficiaries of section 71 alimony trusts as well as
beneficiaries of other types of trusts. Ellis v. United States, 288 F: Supp. 168, 170 (W.D. Tenn.

1968).
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be entitled to retain for tax purposes the tax-exempt character of any
trust income distributed to her. Thus while section 71(a) seems to
require "the full amount" of alimony payments to be included in gross
income, 31 section 682(b) may reasonably be construed as permitting the
exclusion from gross income of trust distributions derived from interest
on tax-exempt securities.32 Two cases, Muriel Dodge Neeman3 and
Anita Quinby Stewart,3 which were decided under the 1939 Code, are
commonly cited as having considered this problem. However, neither
of these conflicting Tax Court decisions are of material assistance in
determining the question raised by the instant facts because the cases
dealt with the issue only peripherally and under substantially different
3
facts.
Interpreting the language of section 71(a) in the "light of its
ordinary meaning and significance," the instant court found that even
though Congress intended that alimony trust distributions be taxed
without distinguishing between income and corpus, 3 Congress did not
state that all alimony payments, regardless of source, were to be
included in the recipient's gross income. The court found no evidence
in the language or legislative history of section 71(a) that Congress
intended to create an exception to the standard conduit principles
applicable to other trusts under Subchapter J of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. 37 Observing that taxes should be imposed by Congress
rather than the courts3 and finding that serious doubt existed as to the
the taxability to plaintiff of the distributions from tax-exempt trust
income, the court resolved the doubt in favor of the taxpayer and
31.

See note 21 supra and accompanying text.

32. See Anita Quinby Stewart, 9 T.C. 195 (1947).
33.
34.

26 T.C. 864 (1956), affd per curiam, 255 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1958).
9 T.C. 195 (1947).

35.

Neither case involved the same arrangement for making alimony payments as that in

the instant case. In Stewart, which allowed the claimed exemption, the wife received distributions

of tax-exempt trust income as the assignee of her former husband, the designated trust beneficiary.
The court in Neeman denied the wife's claim for an exemption of tax-exempt trust income that
she allegedly received in payments made directly to her by her husband.
36. See note 20 supra.
37. In support of the contention that § 71(a) creates an exception to the standard conduit
principles stated in §§ 652(b) and 662(b), the Government relied on Neeman. The court
distinguished Neentan and stated that "[t]o the extent that Neenan might be construed . . .
applicable to the present case in regard to the immateriality of the source of alimony payments,
we respectfully decline to follow it." 416 F.2d at 898.

38. See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 579 (1965); American Automobile Ass'n
v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 697 (1961).
39. See McFeely v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 102, 111 (1935); United States v. Mcrriam,
263 U.S. 179, 187-88 (1923); Gellman v. United States, 235 F.2d 87, 93 (8th Cir. 1956)i Shattuck
v. Gallagher, 218 F.2d 428, 429 (6th Cir. 1955).
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declined to extend the meaning of section 71(a) beyond the language

enacted by Congress. Approving the district court's interpretation 0 of
section 682(b), the court held that the section required that the recipient

of payments from a section 71 (a) trust be considered a trust beneficiary
as specified in Part I of Subchapter J4 and that plaintiff could,

therefore, exclude from her gross income, the portion of distributed
trust income derived from tax-exempt securities.
Section 71 (a) states the rules for the taxation of periodic payments

received by a wife to discharge the obligation of support and other
marital obligations imposed upon the husband by court decree or

written agreement between the parties following a divorce or
separation. This section applies as well to the distributions from a trust

that is created for the purpose of making such payments. Section
682(a) governs those trusts that are created prior to and not in
contemplation of divorce or separation, and the income from which
would, except for the provisions of that section, be taxable to the

husband.42 Consequently, a trust that meets the criteria established in
section 71 (a) cannot qualify for treatment under section 682(a).4 3 The
applicability of both sections is conditioned upon the existence of a

4
divorce or separation decree or a written separation agreement. It

would seem that Congress, having delineated these precise distinctions
as to the circumstances in which each section is to apply, did not intend

to render them meaningless by taxing the two types of trusts in the
same way.45 Thus an ordinary trust, which because of the divorce or

separation of the settlor and the beneficiary becomes a section 682(a)
trust, continues to be taxed in accordance with the ordinary trust rules

of Subchapter J with the exception that the incidence of the tax on
40. 288 F. Supp. at 169-71.
41. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 641-83.
42. Treasury Regulation § 1.682-1 indicates that even the beneficiary of a pre-existing
trust, otherwise taxable under § 682(a), will be taxable under § 71(a) if trust distributions are
used to discharge an obligation imposed upon or assumed by the husband under a divorce or
separation decree or separation agreement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.682-1 (a)(2), (4) (1957); Rev. Rul.
65-283, 1965-2 CumI. BULL. 25. But cf A. Michaelson, supra note 5, at 85. This interpretation is
predicated upon the somewhat nebulous distinction between a pre-existing trust that is formally
included in the decree or agreement and one that, although considered by the parties in
determining the amount of the husband's obligation, is not formally included in the court's decree
or the parties written agreement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.682-1(a)(4) Examples (1)-(2) (1957). This
severe restriction upon the applicability of § 682(a) does not seem to be compelled by the
statutory language or the legislative history of the section.
43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-l(a)(2) (1957).
44. See Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b) (1957); Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-I(a)(I) (1957).
45. It has been suggested, however, that there is no policy justification for distinguishing
between pre-existing trusts and those taxed under § 71 (a). Note, supra note 22, at 895.
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distributions of trust income is imposed upon the wife rather than the
husband. The section 71(a) trust, however, having been created for the

special purpose of discharging alimony or support obligations, is
subject to special tax rules. The congressional design to tax section

71(a) beneficiaries under rules other than those applicable to
beneficiaries of ordinary trusts is demonstrated by the express provision
in section 71(a) for the taxation of distributions from trust corpus as
well as trust income. This provision has the effect of making alimony
trust distributions analogous to alimony payments which are made
directly from the income of the husband.4" In view of the distinctions
between the applicability and taxability of section 71(a) and section
682(a) trusts, section 71(a) trust distributions should be taxed
consistently with discernible congressional objectives, precluding the
determination that section 71(a) does not create exceptions to

Subchapter J rules.47 The construction of section 682(b) adopted by the
instant court evidences a failure to accord adequate weight to the

intended design and function of section 7148 as well as an insensitivity
to the need for equitable treatment of all taxpayers within the limits
of the existing tax structure. The scope of section 682(b), when
construed in accordance with the legislative history of all relevant Code

sections, should be limited to the determination of the tax year in
which distributions from section 71(a) or section 682(a) trusts are to
be included in the gross income of trust beneficiaries.49 Consequently,
46. Under § 71(a), the full amount of payments made directly from the husband's income
are taxable to the wife without regard to the source from which these payments are made. See
Muriel Dodge Neeman, 26 T.C. 864 (1956), affd per curiam, 255 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1958). Even
if the husband's income is technically traceable to a tax-exempt source, the income loses its taxexempt character when it passes through his hands to his former wife.
47. '"The intention of the lawmaker controls in the construction of taxing acts as it does
in the construction of other statutes, and that intention is to be ascertained . . . by considering
it in connection with the context, the general purposes of the statute in which it is found, the
occasion and circumstances of its use and other appropriate tests for the ascertainment of the
legislative will."' Gellman v. United States, 235 F.2d 87, 89 (8th Cir. 1956), quoting Hclvcring
v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1934).
48. In a comprehensive analysis of the changes made by Congress in the 1942 amendment
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Alan L. Gornick concluded that "It]his review of the
alimony and separate maintenance provisions of the Revenue Act of 1942 . . . leads to the
inescapable conclusion that Congress attempted to cover every conceivable payment that might
be made as alimony or in the nature of alimony and to subject all such payments to a uniform
rule." Gornick, supra note 16, at 51.
49. The congressional committee reports which accompanied the Revenue Bill of 1942
indicate that this was the intended purpose of § 171(b) and that the sentence which designates
the wife as a "beneficiary" under Part I, Subchapter J was intended merely to clarify this
purpose. See S. REP. No. 1631, supra note 15, at 85; H.R. REP. No. 2333, supra note 15, at 73;
note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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distributions from tax-exempt alimony trust income should not be
exempted from taxation by sections 652(b) and 662(b) of Subchapter
J as the instant court concluded. These distributions should be fully

taxable when received from a trust governed by section 71(a).5 No
rational basis has been suggested for distinguishing between the

taxation of distributions from trust corpus and distributions from taxexempt trust income; it is submitted that none exists. Taxation of all

payments received by beneficiaries of section 71(a) trusts is consistent
with the intended function of section 71,51 and achieves uniformity in
the taxation of this homogenous class of taxpayers, a characteristic

which is fundamental to a just and equitable tax system."
50. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. Prior to the enactment of § 22(k), alimony
payments were taxable to the husband and excluded from the gross income of the wife; therefore,
any tax-exempt interest received by the husband was not included in the gross income of either
party. Taxation of the § 71(a) beneficiary on all distributions from the trust without regard to
the character of the income prevents either the husband or wife from benefiting from the
exemption. Thus income which was not taxed prior to the 1942 amendment is subjected to income
tax under the provisions of § 71(a) without any expression of congressional intent to levy this
tax. This result, however, seems to be compelled by the full import of the section and its legislative
history.
51. Seenote5lsupra.
52. See Gornick, supra note 16, at 51.

